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Cambodia is seriously affected by landmines and unexploded ordnance (Uxo), due to almost 
three decades of various armed conflicts in the latter part of the twentieth century. Landmines 
and Uxo explosions are claimed to have caused more than 60,000 victims since 1979. In 1996 
the number of casualties rose as high as 4313, out of which the civilian share was 40%, 772 
persons were injured or killed in 2003 and 891 in 2004. In addition to the accident risk, mines 
and Uxo also constitute a significant obstacle to rehabilitation and development activities in 
many areas.  
Mine action resources have to be carefully managed to respond to national humanitarian and 
development priorities. Besides humanitarian imperatives mine action in Cambodia has a 
crucial role to play in supporting the socio-economic development and poverty reduction 
strategies set by the Royal Government (RGC). However, little information about the socio-
economic benefits of mine action has so far been collected. 
This cost-benefit analysis (CBA) of mine clearance operations in Cambodia was launched by 
the national regulatory and coordinating body, the Cambodian Mine Action and Victims 
Assistance Authority (CMAA) in cooperation with UNDP. The socio-economic benefits of 
mine action will be assessed covering the period since the start of the programme in 1992, and 
a cost benefit analysis model developed for the use of the RGC and stakeholders involved in 
mine clearance. 
Cambodia staged aggressive economic growth between 1993 and 1996, but ongoing civil 
strife, domestic political instability, the Asian financial crisis, and the failure of the 
government to implement necessary policy and legal reforms sharply slowed down economic 
activities and foreign investment. Thus about 36 % of the population still lives in absolute 
poverty, lacking the necessary minimum level of 2100 calories per person per day. Livelihood 
systems are not secure in particular for most rural communities, which comprise 
predominantly subsistence farmers. An estimated 60 % of the households there suffer from 
food deficits. Cambodia’s land problems are particularly acute. During the years with war and 
conflicts hundreds of thousands of people were displaced, entire families were wiped-out, and 
different groups obtained overlapping claims to the same land or its resources.  
The mine/Uxo problem is still serious even though the number of mine victims is decreasing. 
Uxo victims, however, now constitute more than 50% of the casualties and the number is 
rising. About 70% of the mine victims are exposed to accidents while travelling, doing farm 
work or collecting wood, whereas 59% of the Uxo victims were tampering with the Uxo, 
while another 18% were lookers on. Males are much more frequently exposed to mine and 
Uxo accidents then females. Men and boys constitute 88% of the total number of casualties. 
At mine accidents 80% of the victims are men and 11% boys, Uxo incidents, however, 
involve just as many boys as men. 
The extent of the mine/Uxo infested area in Cambodia is disputed; in particular which parts of 
it that should be given priority for clearance. It is strongly recommended to revise the 
estimates of contaminated area. 
Mine action is considered by the RGC as one of the top priorities for rehabilitation and 
development of the country. It has been fully integrated among Cambodia’s Millennium 
Development Goals and in its Poverty Reduction Strategy. The Kingdom of Cambodia is 
committed to the Ottawa Convention on the ban of landmines 
 
 vii
The Cambodian National Mine Action Strategy 2004 states that clearance of the worst-
affected areas will be given priority to reduce as soon as possible the risk of death or injury to 
individuals living in landmine/Uxo -affected areas. The goal is to clear the remaining parts of 
the severely contaminated land by 2012-2015, while targeting a decrease in the number of 
mine and Uxo accidents towards a minimum at the end of the same period. Realistically it is 
anticipated, however, that mine action operations will need to continue even beyond 2020.  
It is also admitted that while the clearance of minefields can reduce the number of mine 
accidents, other measures like mine risk education will have to be strengthened in order to 
reduce the number of Uxo casualties. From 1992 to December 2003 the various mine 
clearance operators had cleared a total area of about 252 km2. 
The mine action strategy distinguishes between clearance of severely mined villages with 
high levels of casualties, and providing access to productive land improving the living 
conditions for poor people, de-mining of specific areas such as historical sites to promote 
development of the tourist industry, or clearing infrastructure such as roads allowing 
communication with other parts of the country. The programme aims at putting in place a 
community based, transparent, participative and decentralized process to identify those 
villages, families and persons that will be entitled to receive cleared lands. 
The appraisal of the gains from mine action towards reduced human loss are based on 
calculations of the potential contributions from an average Cambodian mine victim to the 
productive activities of the country. This must not, however, be conceived of as the value of a 
human life. Still it is in line with benefit calculations regularly undertaken by other types of 
initiatives aimed at saving lives and reducing accidents risk. 
The agricultural land cleared under the Cambodian mine action programme is specifically 
destined for distribution among the poorest parts of the population. The staple food item in 
Cambodia is rice. The output from rice production will therefore be used as a guideline for the 
production value, also including livestock production as a complementary trade. Mine 
clearance related to irrigation canals and systems aims at reopening the possibility for 
irrigation of agricultural areas. Clearance of a canal area can thus benefit a much wider extent 
of agricultural land. 
These are indications that landmine damage to domestic animals might constitute a significant 
economic loss. This could call for an improved reporting system. 
Clearance of roads will benefit the road users providing more convenient transport 
opportunities, reduced travel time and travel costs. Mine-contaminated road links may 
generally hinder road users from travelling the shortest route to their destinations. Clearance 
of wells, school areas and health stations will in the same way provide user benefits from the 
reduced need for travelling to alternative facilities in more distant locations. Clearance of 
historical sites and temples are evaluated as of their capacity to create more revenues to the 
country from the tourist industry. 
Four agencies are currently involved in the mine action programme in Cambodia. There is 
little standardization among the operators as of the approach to the tasks, the set-up of teams 
for the field work, techniques and types of equipment in use. Competition among the 
operators is limited, as there is no regular practice of putting larger clearance tasks out on 
tender. Each operator to a large extent benefits from its proper and regular sources for funding 
The operators should be required to provide better data on the cost of conducting mine action 
activities. Some operators are in the process of developing their accounting procedures, which 
could result in better cost-estimates with more details on costs of clearing different types of 
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areas, with various approaches and techniques etc, information which to a large degree is non-
existent now. 
Mine action is contributing substantial values to the Cambodian economy and the country in 
general. Analysis of the 2004 clearance programme comes out with a benefit cost ratio (BCR) 
of 0.38, implying that benefits are in general 38% higher than the costs, on basis of an average 
clearance cost rate of US$ 0.9 per m2. The internal rate of return will on the same assumptions 
be 14%. 
The benefits amount to about US$ 37 million in total, distributed with 80% on clearance for 
development and 20% on the reduced human loss. Roads and bridges make up the largest 
parts with 45%, even though such clearance tasks only comprise 19% of the total area cleared. 
Smaller size tasks related to irrigation canals also contribute considerably. For agricultural 
land the situation is inverse, it constitutes as much as 65% of the cleared area while making 
up 28% of the benefits. 
The benefits from renewed access to more direct road links can be considerably larger that the 
costs generally required for clearance. Clearance of roads and bridges could thus be 
undertaken also in cases of relatively high cost levels. The benefits from renewed access to 
wells for local water supply, schools and health stations have likewise few difficulties with 
justifying clearance, on basis of the reduced travel time and travel costs for the users and the 
pupils.  
These are excellent candidates in a development perspective, and such tasks should be given 
priority as far as benefits in economic terms are concerned. It is evident that the programme 
benefits could be enhanced by diverting more of the clearance activity towards rural 
infrastructure like roads, water supply, schools etc, and also to sites attracting tourism.  
The output per ha of arable land is on the average rather moderate in Cambodia. Yet the main 
conclusion is not that clearance of agricultural areas is unprofitable. There is, however, a call 
for conscious prioritization, a planning process capable of identifying those areas and tasks 
that are of highest importance to the local communities.  
In the agricultural sector a high priority should be given to the reopening of irrigation systems 
permitting dry season cultivation of arable land. Benefits could here be extensive and have 
important consequences for the rural economy and for food production.  
Clearance for casualty reduction also needs to be well targeted in most cases and locations in 
order to have the desired effect. Improved assessments could be made of which parts of the 
extensive mined area in the country that are generating the bulk of the mine/Uxo accidents, 
representing a danger to the people now and in future years with expected population 
movements etc. In spite of the excellent statistics on mine/Uxo casualties and incidents in 
Cambodia, there are lacking elements in the analysis that could help direct the clearance 
activity towards the most risky locations. 
Programme benefits cover clearance costs in all provinces. The 4 provinces of Battambang, 
Odtar Meanchey, Banteay Meanchey and Preah Vihear collect the bulk (78%) of the benefits 
from the 2004 clearance programme. The benefit-cost ratio (BCR) is, however, highest in 
Kampong Cham and Pailin. The main part of the benefits comes from gains related to 
economic development. Still the reduced human loss is an essential factor, contributing to 
increase the programme benefits particularly in Pailin.  
Mine action’s contribution in the years 1992-2003 to increase the country’s paddy production 
could amount to over 50,000 tonnes annually. This production increase has been made 
possible on reclaimed agricultural land and through renewed access to irrigation canals. This 
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constitutes in general a 3% growth in paddy production in the mine action regions, but could 
be even more important for food security in provinces like Pailin, Kep, Banteay Meanchey 
and Battambang. 
A transparent and equitable system for redistribution of the reclaimed land is an important 
goal under the mine action programme. The cleared areas may have provided land and 
contributed to improve land security for about 160,000 families over the period 1992-2003, 
that is to say for over 13,000 on the average each year.  
Clearance of water supply systems and rural wells has improved the access to safe drinking 
water in rural areas. An estimated 1400 wells and ponds have been cleared in the course of the 
mine action programme 1992-2003. 
De-mining school premises contributes to improving the education system so that more 
children can be able to complete school. Mine clearance is also frequently required to provide 
access to rural health stations, which are much needed in the fight against the spread of 
diseases and to reduce child and maternal mortality. It is estimated that about 60 health 
stations have been cleared under the mine action programme. 
There are indications that landmine damage to domestic animals might constitute a significant 
economic loss. This could call for an improved reporting system, if possible through CMVIS. 
The extent of the mine/Uxo infested area in Cambodia is disputed; in particular what parts of 
it should be given priority for clearance. It is strongly recommended to revise the estimates of 
the contaminated area. 
The CMAA database on cleared areas needs to be consolidated, so that it can provide official 
figures for clearance on location (province, district), types of areas, techniques etc for the 
individual years since the start of the mine action programme. As of today this information 
exists on different files which can be incomplete and inconsistent. 
The operators should be required to provide better data on the cost of conducting mine action 
activities. As a first approach more information about clearance time (in hours) of different 
types of tasks and areas could be demanded. 
A library or Information and Documentation Centre should be established at CMAA to secure 
the institutional memory. 
Annex 1 contains some straightforward methods, based on cost-benefit analysis, to be applied 
as instruments for assessing socio-economic and poverty reduction impacts of future mine 
clearance operations. The approach is based on data presented and methods developed in the 
previous parts of the report. 
The CMAA Socio-economic Cluster should in particular have a responsibility with following 
up the cost-benefit analysis.  
 1
1. Introduction 
1.1 The mine/Uxo problem 
Cambodia is seriously affected by landmines and unexploded ordnance (Uxo), due to almost 
three decades of various armed conflicts in the latter part of the twentieth century. Landmines 
and Uxo explosions are claimed to have caused more than 60,000 victims since 1979. In 1996 
the number of casualties rose as high as 4313, out of which the civilian share was 40%. Of the 
772 persons injured or killed in 2003 and the 891 in 2004 almost all were civilians. One third 
of the victims were children in the countryside, especially in areas considered indispensable 
for new settlement of poor people. 
Cambodia was heavily bombarded by the USA between 1969 and 1973 in connection with the 
Vietnam war, approximately 2.4 million tons of bombs were dropped over the country. 
During the Khmer Rouge period 1975-79 virtually all well-educated Cambodians were killed 
or forced into exile. Eventually, an estimated 1.5 million Cambodians, or one in six died from 
execution, starvation, or disease before the overthrow of the regime by Vietnam, the former 
ally of the Khmer Rouge. 
The country lost almost an entire generation of its educated people and many war-affected 
groups, internally displaced people and returning refugees, widows, orphans, child 
combatants, remain acutely vulnerable. An estimated one person in 250 is disabled, and war 
plus the ongoing scourge of landmines have resulted in the highest proportion of amputees 
(one in 384) recorded in the world. The war period left Cambodia with between four and six 
million mines and millions of Uxo in the ground. In addition to the accident risk, mines and 
Uxo also constitute a significant obstacle to rehabilitation and development activities in many 
areas. This situation prevails despite the fact that mine action programmes covering clearance, 
marking, awareness rising and training have been going on since 1992, resulting in clearance 
of 251 km2 of land so far. 
According to the Level One Survey (L1S) from 2002, about 12% of the villages in Cambodia 
have to cope with high contamination of landmines and Uxo.  The problem is severe and 
access to essential facilities such as water, roads, bridges and cultivable land is restricted and 
hazardous for many rural civilians. Still it has been recognized that the L1S estimates for 
contaminated land were too high. Preliminarily a share of 10% of the L1S figures has been 
proposed as reflecting the actual situation (2004), comprising 425 km2 of contaminated land, 
out of which about 300 km2 have been given the highest priority.1 Data from the operators 
suggest a priority area of 260 km2. 
Uxo victims have over the last years constituted more than 50% of the victims. While people 
are exposed to mine accidents during farm work, collecting wood or travelling, the majority 
of the Uxo victims were actually tampering with the Uxo. This fact raises the question to what 
extent clearance of contaminated areas can contribute to alleviate the risk of Uxo accidents. 
The overall development goal of the mine action programme is to reduce the level and impact 
of land mine/Uxo contamination in Cambodia in a transparently prioritised, cost effective and 
safe manner, so that the maximum number of people, predominantly rural but also urban, can 
go about their lives free from the threat of land mines/Uxo thus permitting reconstruction, 
reintegration and development activities to take place in a safe environment. The National 
Mine Action Strategy 2004 states that Cambodia has a long-term mine & UXO problem, 
which will require national striving in mine action for the next two decades. The medium-
                                                 
1 See chapter 3.1. 
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term vision is to move towards zero impact from land mines and UXO by 2012, the long-term 
vision is to have a Cambodia free from the negative humanitarian and socio-economic 
impacts of landmines/ UXO by 2020. Cambodia is a state party to the Anti Personnel Mine 
Ban Treaty (the Ottawa Convention). 
The Cambodian Mine Action and Victims Assistance Authority (CMAA) was established in 
September 2000, replacing the Cambodian Mine Action Centre (CMAC) as the national 
coordinating and regulatory body in charge of mine action management and policy 
development. UNDP program support to CMAA started in 2001. Other agencies operating 
within mine action comprise local and international companies and NGOs, government 
institutions and the armed forces. The coordination is rather loose.  
Mine action resources have to be carefully managed to respond to national humanitarian and 
development priorities. Besides humanitarian imperatives mine action in Cambodia has a 
crucial role to play in supporting the socio-economic development and poverty reduction 
strategies set by the Royal Government (RGC).  
However, little information about the socio-economic benefits of mine action has so far been 
collected. Furthermore there is a lack of specific tools to assist in the development of nation 
wide mine action priorities based on the amount of resources available and the development 
objectives of the RGC, and at the local level in the selection of minefields for clearance and in 
particular for conducting socio-economic cost-benefit analyses. 
 
1.2 Objectives of the cost-benefit analysis 
This cost-benefit analysis (CBA) of mine clearance operations in Cambodia was launched by 
CMAA in cooperation with UNDP. The socio-economic benefits of mine action will be 
assessed covering the period since the start of the programme in 1992, and a cost benefit 
analysis model developed for the use of the RGC and stakeholders involved in mine 
clearance. 
The overall objective of the assignment is to: 
− Provide a quantified assessment of mine action contribution to the socio-economic 
development of the country and the poverty reduction strategy/ Cambodian 
Millennium Development Goals (MDG) over the period 1993-2003.  
− Devise a mechanism, based on a cost-benefit analysis, to assess the socio-economic 
and poverty reduction impact of future mine action operations.  
The analysis of the “benefits” of mine clearance should include poverty reduction/ human 
development indicators in addition to the economic indicators, allowing for an assessment of 
the contribution of mine clearance to the achievement of the Cambodian MDG and the 
National Poverty Reduction Strategy.2 
A tool will be devised for cost-benefit analysis of mine action sector activities, looking at the 
impact of clearance on other sectors, such as infrastructure development, access to natural 
resources, agriculture and tourism and the ultimate impact on overall development and 
poverty reduction. The socio-economic impact of mine clearance in religious and historical 
sites, especially Angkor should be duly analysed and quantified. 
                                                 
2 UNDP (August 2004): Terms of Reference Cost-benefit analysis of mine clearance operations in Cambodia 
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1.3 Main approach and methodology 
Conceptually, the socio-economic loss from accidents and contamination with landmines and 
Uxo can be divided in three broad categories:  
(1) Loss of life, health, human production potential, and human welfare resulting from 
mine/Uxo accidents;  
(2) Blocking access to mine-infested land and loss of associated production or 
consumption benefits from the areas concerned.  
(3) Distortion of behaviour due to the existence of mines or Uxo, with consequent socio-
economic losses resulting from longer travel distances or journeys and activities not 
undertaken due to greater distances and difficulties etc.  
The costs connected with addressing the problem are related to the different aspects of the 
mine action programme, clearance operations, mine accidents during clearance operations, 
mine risk education and awareness, programme administration, planning etc. 
Benefits minus costs or net benefits will evidently be a relevant socio-economic criterion, 
dividing by costs facilitates comparison of projects or clearance tasks of different sizes. The 
benefit-cost ratio or BCR (benefits minus cost divided by cost) is thus a widely applied 
criterion for ranking projects. 
 
Benefit-Cost Ratio (BCR): 
 
The higher the BCR the more well-justified is the project.  A negative ratio indicates that this 
clearance activity cannot be vindicated on the basis of the socio-economic benefits alone, as 
far as they are considered in the analysis.  Different projects or clearance tasks can be ranked 
by their  BCRs, and  if  resources  are  limited  there  will  be  a  cut-off  point  for  the  BCR,  
below which the project/task concerned should not be implemented.  
This needs not imply, however, that other than economic benefits and costs are irrelevant; 
frequently there will be additional considerations to take into account. Still in many cases the 
non-economic benefits may be related to the same factors that are basic for the calculation of 
economic benefits, in mine action this will typically be the number of mine/Uxo victims 
expected avoided in future years, and the size and types of area that can be reclaimed for 
useful purposes. In such cases the actual priority indicated may still be relevant even though 
the BCR might experience an upgrading in magnitude through the inclusion of non-economic 
benefits, so that a larger number of activities and tasks come out on the positive side. This 
could call for more resources to mine action, but nevertheless by withholding the main rank of 
priority. 
The break-even point is when the BCR is 0.  Then benefits will be equal to costs for the given 
discount rate, which is set at 10% in this study.  A clearance task with a BCR of zero thus 
produces just enough benefits to meet its costs at a discount rate of 10%. Lowering the 
discount rate would increase the BCR of a project, by assigning more importance to future 
benefits.   
The discount rate will depend among others on the general level of interest rates in the 
country net of the inflation rate, or how people in general value future benefits and losses. In 
case a person has the choice between 100 US$ today or 100 US$ in one year, it is expected 
that he will choose to have the money now, future benefits would be of less worth to him.  
Benefit – Cost 
Cost 
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An individual who is precisely indifferent between having 100 US$ now and 110 US$ in one 
year, would recognize that he has a personal discount rate of 10%. Consequently he could 
apply this rate to discount future benefits or losses to find what they are worth for him from 
today’s point of view, that is to say by calculating their Net Present Value. On similar grounds 
it can be assumed that society has its discount rate, which may be different from country to 
country and change over time.  
A high discount rate (everything else being equal) means that few projects will come out with 
a satisfactory BCR. Nevertheless, it is generally wrong to think that projects in the developing 
world should be subject to low discount rates. Capital is scarce and competition for funds 
should be high among a large number of different uses. 
The BCR permits reading directly the percent relation between the benefits and the costs. A 
BCR of 0.5 means that the benefits are 50% larger than the costs, with a BCR of 1 the 
benefits will be 100% larger than the costs (or 2 times larger) etc.  
An alternative evaluation criterion is the Internal Rate of Return (IRR). The IRR constitutes a 
more intuitive measure of gain, by presenting a percentage rate of return on costs, much like 
the rate of interest on bank deposits. Generally the IRR is defined as the discount rate which 
makes the value of discounted future benefits equal to the costs. The IRR can be compared for 
example to the prevailing rate of interest net of inflation in a country.   
A discount rate of 10% is being used in this study, and the minimum or break-even IRR 
should consequently be in the order of 10%. This will normally correspond to a BCR of zero 
as defined above.  
The general time-horizon for benefits and costs is in this study set at 20 years. After that time 
benefits are considered too uncertain to be reckoned with. Benefits are discounted over 20 
years, while all clearance costs normally are assumed to be incurred in the first year.  
A main output from the analysis will be a ranking of different clearance tasks or activities in 
mine action according to their economic viability measured by their score on the BCR. A 
number of assumptions will be made to structure information into some more general cases, 
which are presumed to be typical for the areas where mine action is going on, the individual 
provinces etc. The validity of such assumptions should be checked, however, when data from 
the analysis is applied at specific clearance tasks. 
The analysis will be based on available data and statistics mainly from recent years (2000-04), 
still unit costs and benefits can to some extent be used for the evaluation of mine action in 
earlier periods, with appropriate checking of assumptions. Regular updates will also be 
needed when the results from this study are applied at cost benefit analysis of future mine 
action activities.    
After a shorter discussion (in chapter 2) of the most important social and development issues 
of the country, the extent of the mine and Uxo problem in Cambodia is described (in chapter 
3). The goals, activities and organisation of the mine action programme are then related 
(chapter 4), with among others an assessment of the mine action programme’s main targets 
and achievements (chapter 4.3).  
The report then proceeds to explore the different elements entering into the cost benefit 
analysis of mine action. The first aspect is the humanitarian, the effect of mine action towards 
reducing the number of mine and Uxo casualties and the risk of accidents (chapter 5). The 
evaluation of the gains is here based on the productive contribution of a typical mine/Uxo 
victim over his/her lifetime. The resulting figures should in no case be conceived of as the 
value of a human life. Other factors which are more difficult to quantify could certainly play a 
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role when considering the humanitarian aspect of mine action. Still the approach is consistent 
with standard methodology for the evaluation of reduced accident risk in other sectors like 
road safety.  
Another main component of a mine action programme is the clearance activity aimed at social 
and economic development, reopening access to productive areas, to infrastructure and other 
facilities and resources (chapter 6). These activities must also take into account the poverty 
reduction and social security aspects of development. The issues addressed here comprise 
clearance for agricultural purposes, mine and Uxo contamination of irrigation canals, roads, 
school premises, water supply, historic and cultural sites including temple areas, public 
buildings etc. 
The cost side of the mine action activity will be considered (chapter 7), covering both the 
direct resource use for clearance and operations, and the more indirect expenses linked to 
planning and administration of the programme. In principle all input of resources to the 
programme should be comprised, including donations and gifts. 
The benefit and the cost side will then be compared and balanced (chapter 8) in order to 
evaluate the economic viability of different tasks and cases, and to provide guidelines for 
prioritisation and recommendations on strategies in mine action. In this evaluation the 
Benefit-Cost Ratio (BCR) will be used extensively, and to some extent also the Internal Rate 
of Return.  
The methodology developed will then be applied to evaluate the achievements of the 
Cambodian mine action programme in total (chapter 9). This evaluation will be conducted for 
a recent year (2003), as information is scarcer for the earlier periods.  
The mine action programme’s contributions to achieve the objectives of the country’s poverty 
reduction strategy and to fulfil the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) will then be 
assessed (chapter 10). The main part of the report ends with a summary of important 
conclusions and recommendations (chapter 11).  
On basis of the methodology and data presented the report proceeds with working out some 
specific tools for planning purposes that can be applied at future evaluation and prioritisation 
of clearance tasks in mine action (Annex 1). The objective is to devise a mechanism, based on 
cost-benefit methodology, to assess the socio-economic and poverty reduction impact of 





2. Social and economic context 
2.1 The country and the people 
The population of Cambodia is about 13.5 million, comprising for a large part rural 
fishermen, farmers, and artisans living in 2.2 million households, about 85% of the people 
live in rural areas. The majority of the people live in fairly permanent villages near the major 
bodies of water in the Tonle Sap Basin-Mekong Lowlands region. About 90 percent of the 
population is ethnic Khmer. The remaining 5-10 percent include Chinese-Khmer, Khmer 
Islam or Chams, ethnic hill-tribe people, known as the Khmer Loeu, and Vietnamese.  
Agriculture is the most important sector, accounting for 33% of GDP, and employing about 
70 percent of the labour force, but between 12% and 15% of these have no agricultural land. 
Many households are female headed, 19% in rural areas and 25% in the capital Phnom Penh. 
This is partly an effect of the wars, resulting in a surplus of women in certain age-groups. 
Among the ASEAN countries Cambodia currently has the next highest population growth 
with 2.49%, being surpassed only by Laos. The fertility rate is high, and highest among poor 
people. At the same time the country has experienced a substantial fertility decline since the 
1960s.3 
Cambodia is not densely populated by South-East Asian standards. Still, much of the 
population is concentrated in the plains region, where pressure on land is very high. Access to 
adequate land is a widespread problem because significant areas are inaccessible, unsuited to 
cultivation, remain contaminated by landmines and Uxo, and because land ownership is 
unequal. As a result, over 14 per cent of rural households are landless. In addition, common 
pool resources such as forests and riverine areas are central to the livelihoods of the majority 
of rural Cambodians, while many such areas have been taken by powerful individuals and 
converted to logging concessions, plantations, or commercial development. 
Because of its multiple regime changes and in particular the severe policies of the Khmer 
Rouge to create an egalitarian society, Cambodia’s land problems are particularly acute. 
Hundreds of thousands of people have been displaced, entire families were wiped-out, and 
different groups obtained overlapping claims to the same land or its resources. Almost one-
third of the households covered by the 1998 census reported that they had previously resided 
outside their place of enumeration. Many reasons for this migration were reported, with 
almost 14 per cent citing ‘repatriation/return after displacement’. This latter group is 
particularly likely to be landless. 
In an effort to address such problems, governments in the late 1980s-early 1990s issued a 
series of decrees allowing the issue of legal titles to those who needed land, often on a first-
come, first-serve basis. Well-placed officials, senior military officers, and others in the elite 
were often first in line, but the majority of claims, from vulnerable groups such as women-
headed households, indigenous peoples, returnees and displaced people, and demobilised 
soldiers, found themselves hostage to the shortcomings in the systems to administer these 
provisions. At least one million claimants did not receive land. 
Efforts to address these post-clearance land use concerns led to the formation of the Land Use 
Planning Units (LUPU), which appear to have prevented the worst abuses. But the 
government’s inability to deal with the broader land management issues led to the widespread 
eruption of protest demonstrations in the late 1990s. Local and international NGOs initiated a 
campaign for land reform, which led to a new land act in 2001. This new law also contains a 
                                                 
3 Royal Government of Cambodia (2003): National Population Policy, page ii. 
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programme for distribution of unoccupied state land via social concessions and established 
provincial land dispute commissions.4 
Labour force is growing rapidly (2.6%) with more than 200,000 new entrants into the labour 
market every year. About 35% of the workers are employed in more than one job. From 1998 
to 2000 the average growth in agricultural employment was only 1.6%. Employment in the 
secondary and tertiary sectors was limited, while industrial growth was substantial with 43%. 
Still this benefited only about 8% of the population.5 
About 46% of the labour force describes themselves as unpaid family workers. A significant 
percentage of women, 20 percent in Phnom Penh and 68 percent in rural areas, are unpaid 
family workers while the corresponding indicator for men is considerably lower (6% in 
Phnom Penh and 30% in rural areas). 
The production of rice for household consumption and domestic trade is the major economic 
output for most of the rural population. Households supplement rice production with other 
economic activities such as fishing, vegetable and fruit production, gathering of forest 
products, and off-farm employment. 
Since 1993, the Cambodian government has implemented social, economic and legal reforms, 
and improved its support for private-sector led economic growth and trade development. One 
of the most significant changes has been the progress made in transitioning from a centrally-
planned economy to a competitive market economy. Still the country suffers from few 
professional managers or skilled technicians, an undeveloped financial system, and few value-
added products and services to promote international trade.6  
Cambodia staged aggressive economic growth between 1993 and 1996, but ongoing civil 
strife, domestic political instability, the Asian financial crisis, and the failure of the 
government to implement necessary policy and legal reforms sharply slowed down economic 
activities and foreign investment. Per capita gross domestic product (GDP) was in 1998 
estimated to US$ 252, compared to the 1995 level of US$ 321. The estimate for 2002 is US$ 
296 per capita. 
                                                 
4 Paterson and Vanna (2004): A Study of Capacity Development in Mine Action, Case Study of Cambodia 
(GICHD September 2004) page 59. 
5 Kingdom of Cambodia (20 Dec 2002): National Poverty Reduction Strategy 2003-2005, page iii. 
6 Source: WB/MIME (2003): Cambodia Renewable Energy Action Plan (1994-2000). 
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Figure 2.1: Growth rates in GDP per capita, Cambodia 1994-2002. 
















Source: National Institute of Statistics: Cambodia Year Book 2003. 
Garments and footwear industries now contribute more than 90 percent of total exports and 
has been the main engine of growth over the last years, especially since the granting of Most 
Favoured Nation status and preferences by the USA in 1996-97. Still the further prospects for 
development of this sector are not evident, since competition from neighbouring countries has 
increased. The government’s policy is therefore to diversify, in particular into the tourist 
industry, a trade which has experienced both growth and setbacks over the latest years. 
Agricultural production, especially rice production, has responded well to extensive technical 
support by donors and incentives set by government agencies. During 1998/99 to 2001/02 
Cambodia produced rice surpluses ranging from 30,000 to 350,000 tonnes. Still this did not 
eliminate the food shortage in some parts of the country. 
Wood and rubber products, mostly in raw form, are exported primarily by regional traders.  
These products represent between three and four percent of Cambodia's export trade. Cross-
border smuggling is a continuous and overwhelming problem.   
Price inflation, based on the Cambodian reil, has been reduced from triple digits in late 1980s 
to less than one percent in 2000. Throughout most of Cambodia, the US dollar and the local 
currency co-exist in commercial transactions.   
The central objective of the government’s policy is to promote broad-based sustainable 
economic growth with equity, and with the private sector playing the leading role. Economic 
growth is considered central to the promotion of income opportunities to the poor.7  
 
2.2 Poverty reduction 
In Cambodia 36% of the population lives in absolute poverty, lacking the necessary minimum 
level of 2100 calories per person per day. The poverty aspect has many aspects: Lack of food, 
half of all children aged 0-5 years are either stunted or underweight, uncertainties about 
access to natural resources, lack of power, social exclusion, and lack of education are all 
dimensions of poverty. 
                                                 
7 Kingdom of Cambodia (20 Dec 2002): National Poverty Reduction Strategy 2003-2005, page 42. 
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Only 27 out of 1000 school children manage to complete upper secondary school, and not 
more than 37% of Cambodians are functionally literate. In 1999 it was reported that 30% had 
never attended school.8  
The country has the lowest health service utilisation in the world. Infant and maternal 
mortality rates have declined in recent years, but still remain among the highest in the region. 
Life expectancy at birth is 56 years. Most Cambodians lack access to safe water and 
sanitation, less than a third of the rural population has access to clean drinking water, while 
only about 10% are covered by environmental sanitation. Still the proportion of people living 
below the poverty line fell from 39% in 1993/94 to 36% in 1998, in rural areas the share fell 
from 43% to 40%.  
Rural development is essential to alleviate national poverty, since the vast majority or 85% of 
Cambodians lives in rural areas. Development of the agricultural sector, which provides 
employment to 70% of the population and contributes about 45% of the GDP, will play a 
major role here. Better access for rural people to employment and basic infrastructure will 
also contribute to prevent excessive migration to the urban areas, which is a main cause of 
poverty there. 
Livelihood systems are not secure for most rural communities, which comprise predominantly 
subsistence farmers. An estimated 60 % of the households there suffer from food deficits. 
Some villages have access to areas of good forest and are able to forage and hunt, or collect 
timber and non-timber forest products for immediate household consumption or sale. Others 
are able to supplement food crops with fish, but, in general, life is extremely difficult. Food 
stocks can begin running out for many families as early as four months after harvest. 
Around 50% of the villages have 40-60 % of the households living below the official poverty 
line.  Household savings are normally held in the form of assets such as livestock and land. 
These assets are often lost through forced sale due to economic shock such as serious health 
problems in families. Average household incomes vary widely, but the majority in the rural 
areas range from US$ 300 to 700 per annum. With an average family size of just over five in 
rural households, this equates to an annual per capita income of between US$ 60 and 140. 
Through its National Poverty Reduction Strategy (NPRS) 2003-2005 the Government is 
committed to reducing poverty and inequality and to improve the quality of life for the 
population of the country. The NPRS considers landmines as one of the main obstacles 
preventing the poor from access to agricultural lands, creating vulnerability.  Mine action is 
therefore a top priority in rehabilitation and development, in particular for achieving effective 
poverty reduction in rural areas. 
The Poverty Reduction and Mine Actions Strategies state that mine action can contribute to 
poverty reduction by: 
– Reducing the number of casualties which have negative economic consequences for 
affected families; 
– Providing access for the worst-affected communities to essential services and 
infrastructure such as water resources, schools, hospitals and roads; 
– Distributing safe land for settlement and agricultural purposes, contributing to the 
economic reintegration of landless populations in rural areas; 
– Marking contaminated areas and educating and raising awareness as to the dangers of 
landmines and Uxo among the population of suspected areas; 
                                                 
8 National Institute of Statistics: Cambodia Socio-Economic Survey 1999. 
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– Ensuring that the prioritisation and distribution of cleared land are monitored in a 
participatory, equitable and pro-poor manner at the provincial level; 
– Providing assistance to the reintegration and rehabilitation of victims of land mines 
and UXO and their affected communities.9 
 
2.3 The Ottawa Convention 
The Kingdom of Cambodia is committed to the Ottawa Convention on the ban of landmines, 
the government became a signatory in December 1997. Cambodia is thus a state party to the 
Anti Personnel Mine Ban Treaty (APMBT) to enforce national legislation banning the 
production, use, transfer, and stockpiling of anti-personnel mines.   
The member states are committed to take steps consistent with the Convention's core 
humanitarian aims: to clear mined areas, assist victims, and universalise the ban on anti-
personnel mines. Each year the government is obliged to report on the implementation of the 
treaty in Cambodia to the Meeting of the States Parties to the APMBT. 
The Ottawa Convention stipulates among others the following: 
“Each State Party undertakes to destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel mines 
in areas under its jurisdiction or control, as soon as possible but not later than ten years after 
the entry into force of this Convention for that State Party” (Article 5, paragraph 1). 
This is a commitment with serious consequences for Cambodia given the extensive amount of 
suspected mined areas registered there. Still “if a State Party believes that it will be unable to 
destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel mines referred to in paragraph 1 within 
that time period, it may submit a request to a Meeting of the States Parties or a Review 
Conference for an extension of the deadline for completing the destruction of such anti-
personnel mines, for a period of up to ten years” (Article 5, paragraph 5). 
 
2.4 The Millennium Development Goals 
The Millennium Declaration was adopted in September 2000 by all 180 member states of the 
UN. World leaders here agreed to a set of time-bound and measurable goals for combating 
extreme poverty, hunger, diseases, illiteracy, environmental degradation and discrimination 
against women, called the Millennium Development Goals (MDG). The Government of 
Cambodia has signed this declaration, because it is consistent with its long term commitment 
to improve living conditions and reduce poverty.10  
Recognising the large negative impact of mines on the livelihood of people living in rural 
areas, mine action is considered one of the top priorities for the country’s rehabilitation and 
development. The government is further strongly committed to implement the Ottawa 
Convention. De-mining, Uxo and Victims Assistance have therefore been introduced as Goal 
number 9 in the MDG Report 2003. 
In compliance with its obligations towards the Ottawa convention the MDG 9 sets a target to 
move towards zero impact from landmines and Uxo in 2012. The annual number of civilian 
casualties will then have to be reduced to 0, and all suspected areas cleared. It is admitted, 
                                                 
9 National Poverty Reduction Strategy 2003-2005, chapter 4.5.5 and CMAA: National Mine Action Strategy 
2004, chapter  4.2.2. 
10 Kingdom of Cambodia (2003): Cambodia Millennium Development Goals Report 2003, page 9. 
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however, that this may be difficult to achieve. Other actions consist of developing a victim 
assistance framework.11 
Still, mine action, and in particular area clearance may also have impact for other MDGs: 
– Clearance of areas that can be reclaimed for agricultural production can have 
strong impacts for MDG 1- Overall target 2, concerned with reducing the 
proportion of people suffering from hunger. 
– De-mining school premises can contribute to fulfilling MDG 2- Overall target 3, 
aiming at improving the education system so that more children can be able to 
complete school.  
– Mine clearance is also frequently required to provide access to rural health 
stations, which are much needed in the fight against the spread of diseases like 
HIV/AIDS and malaria (MDG 6) and to reduce child mortality (MDG 4) and 
maternal mortality (MGD 5). 
– Clearance of water supply systems and rural wells could have a direct impact on 
MDG 7- Overall target 14, addressing the problem of improved access to safe 
drinking water. 
– Clearance of areas for resettlement, with a transparent and equitable system for 
redistribution of the land, will in general also be important for MDG 7- Overall 
target 16, to improve the access to land security.  
 
More specific measures for the achievements of these goals have been worked out in chapter 
10 of this report. 
 
                                                 
11 Kingdom of Cambodia (2003): Cambodia Millennium Development Goals Report 2003, page 73. 
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3. Mines and Uxo in Cambodia 
3.1 Contamination 
The later 35 years of conflict has left Cambodia one of the world’s most heavily mine- and 
Uxo-contaminated nations. The Level One Survey (L1S) measuring the impact of mines/UXO 
in the entire country was completed in April 2002. Here it was indicated 3,037 suspected 
areas, amounting to 4,466 km² that could be contaminated by mines or Uxo. This represents 
2.5 % of the country's surface area.  
According to the L1S about 1,640 villages, i.e. approximately 12 % of all, have to cope with 
high contamination by landmines and Uxo, and more than 5,500 have Uxo scattered on their 
land.  About 60% of the mine-suspected areas are concentrated in the five provinces of 
Battambang, Banteay Meanchey, Odtar Meanchey, Preah Vihear and Pailin in the north-
western and northern regions of the country. More than 11,000 explosive ordnance disposal 
tasks were recorded. 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Mine and Uxo contamination in Cambodia. Source CMAA12 
 
The mine/Uxo contamination in the country as registered in L1S can be broken down by 
province, with high level of contamination in 7 provinces, moderate level in 9, and low level 
in 8 provinces. 
However, it should be noted that due to the nature of technical requirements and 
methodology, the L1S could not have measured the precise size of the affected areas or the 
scope of the contamination. There are indications both that L1S may have exaggerated the 
contamination in some places and that there may be contaminated areas also outside the L1S 
areas. A study of minefields cleared by the operators in 2003 shows that only 64% of them 
                                                 
12 Source: CMAA (2004): Mine Action Achievements of the Kingdom of Cambodia 1992-2003, chapter 1.2.3. 
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were included in one of the suspected mined areas listed in the L1S, 36% of cleared areas 
were thus outside the L1S.13 
On the other hand, huge suspected surface areas do not need a very urgent clearance; since 
they are located in very remote parts of the country, without population and no fertile land, as 
it is the case in the north of the Siem Reap province.  So the L1S data has to be updated 
regularly and checked by national competent authorities and demining operators, in order to 
provide valuable information. 
In the absence of accurate information on the size of the mine-contaminated area, CMAA has 
used a proportion amounting to 10%14 of the L1S estimates as a planning figure to determine 
the scope of contamination in the country, which means that the current contaminated area 
could comprise about 425 km2 in total.15 Contaminated areas identified by the operating 
agencies (HALO and CMAC) and classified as of high priority, amount to about 260 km2 in 
2004.16  
 
3.2 Human loss 
Between January 1979 and December 2003, Cambodia suffered a total of over 60,000 
mine/Uxo casualties. Despite the relatively large volume of de-mining operations, the level of 
contamination and the number of civilian accidents continue to be among the highest in the 
world, indicating the extraordinarily high level of contamination in the country as a result of 
decades of conflict. In the year 2003 there were 772 and in 2004 a total of 891 people reported 
as direct victims of accidents by mines or Uxo. 
 





















Source: CMVIS: National Census of the victims & survivors of landmines and unexploded ordnance in 
Cambodia. 
                                                 
13 CMAA: Mine Clearance Analysis and Guidance 2004, chapter 1.3. 
14 This figure will be updated as more accurate information of actual contamination becomes available. 
15 CMAA (2004): Five Year Mine Action Plan 2004-2008, chapter 3.1. 
16 Source: National Mine Action Database 
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Of the mine/UXO casualties recorded for the years 1979-2003, about 30% died and 70% have 
suffered non-fatal injuries, i.e. about 40,000. Many of these victims have been maimed and 
are now disabled, having suffered grave injuries as amputation, burns, blindness or paralysis.  
In the earlier years records were less complete and accurate, but civilian casualties peaked at 
1700-1800 per year from 1993-96, falling to about 1300 per year until the end of hostilities in 
late 1998, then dropping again to about 800 per year, with 830 in 2002 and 772 in 2003, while 
the year 2004 experienced a significant leap to 891. 
 


















































Source: CMVIS17 and CMAA18 
 
Still, from 2000 on the number of accidents caused by mines decreased steadily from 443 to 
341 in 2004. Unfortunately this was accompanied by an increasing trend of Uxo casualties, 
from 389 in the year 2000 to 550 in 2004, with a leap of 140 in 2004 alone, so that Uxo 
casualties now constitute well over 50% of the victims. The policy targets in Figure 3.3 of 500 
victims in 2005, 250 in 2010 and 0 in 2012 are reflected in the Cambodian National Mine 
Action Strategy and the Millennium Development Goals, and are designed to comply with the 
Ottawa Convention. 
 
                                                 
17 CMVIS (2003): National Census 
18 Source for Targets 2005-12: CMAA (2004): National Mine Action Strategy 2004, chapter 3.1 and Cambodia 





Figure 3.4: Mine and Uxo casualties January 2003 to May 2004 (source CMAA). 
 
The geographical distribution of mine and Uxo victims in Cambodia (Figure 3.4) shows a 
marked concentration on the regions to the north-west, on the border with Thailand. There are 
also incidents elsewhere, in the central parts of the country and towards the border with 
Vietnam in the south-east. A remarkable feature is the few incidents reported from the east 
and north-east, the regions bordering Laos and Vietnam. These parts of the country were 
heavily bombarded during the Vietnam War and must contain large amounts of mines and 
Uxos. An explanation could be that the sparse population of these regions generate few 
accidents, but there is also a possibility of under-reporting because of lack of inspection and 
communication. The deficient road system discourages people and officials from travelling 
there.  
All provinces and municipalities have been concerned with mine accidents in 2002 or 2003, 
except Phnom Penh and Kep, i.e. 22 out of 24, among these eight had less than one mine 
accident a month.19 In 2004 the Battambang province experienced an average of about 10 




                                                 
19 Battambang province suffered more than 12 MA per month, or 3 MA per week, in 2002. In 2003, 6 MA with 
UXO injured 26 people in Kandal province. 
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Table 3.1: Victims’ activity at the time of mine and Uxo incident (year 2002-2003) 
 Mine Uxo 
Tampering with mine/Uxo 5 % 59 % 
Bystander 3 % 18 % 
Travelling 29 % 1 % 
Farming 21 % 7 % 
Collecting wood 21 % 1 % 
Collecting food 7 % 1 % 
Clearing new land 5 % 3 % 
Burning 1 % 2 % 
Herding 2 % 2 % 
Demining 2 % 0 % 
Military activity 2 % 0 % 
Construction 1 % 0 % 
Fishing 1 % 1 % 
Playing 0 % 1 % 
Other 2 % 4 % 
Total 100 % 100 % 
   Source: CMVIS National Census 
 
Mine and Uxo accidents follow separate patterns: In 2002/2003 about 70% of the mine 
victims were exposed to accidents while travelling, doing farm work or collecting wood, 
whereas 59% of the Uxo victims were tampering with the Uxo, with another 18% standing by 
as lookers on.  
Uxo incidents tend to result in more casualties than mine accidents. Statistics from 2002 show 
that 10 mine incidents caused 13 casualties on the average, while as much as 18 persons could 
be injured in 10 Uxo incidents. In 2003 these rates had increased to 15 persons at 10 mine 
incidents and 20 persons at 10 Uxo incidents. 
 
Table 3.2: Age and gender of mine and Uxo victims (year 2002-2003) 
 Mine Uxo Total 
Men 80 % 42 % 59 % 
Boys 11 % 43 % 29 % 
Women 7 % 5 % 6 % 
Girls 2 % 10 % 6 % 
Total 100 % 100 % 100 % 
   Source: CMVIS National Census 
 
Males are much more frequently exposed to mine and Uxo accidents then females. Men and 
boys constituted 88% of the total number of casualties in 2002-2003. At mine accidents 80% 
of the victims are men 11% boys. Uxo incidents, however, involve just as many boys (43%) 
as men (42%), while girls fall victims (10%) presumably because standing among the lookers 
on. 
Increasing numbers of Uxo victims are now found scattered in almost all provinces. 
Investigations carried out by the Cambodian Red Cross (CRC) and Handicap International of 
Belgium (HI), show that insufficient information about the danger of explosive devices has 
been disseminated in the villages where accidents happened. Individuals tampering with Uxos 
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and lookers on comprise almost half of the casualties.20 If it had not been for that tampering 
of mine/Uxo and on-looking people around, about 330 casualties would have been avoided in 
2003 which is almost half the casualties that year.21 
In Cambodia there is regularly a trend towards high numbers of mine and Uxo casualties in 
the beginning of the year, coinciding with the dry season when villagers are roaming the 
forests in search of food and fuelwood. Most provinces experience lower levels of accidents 
in the wet season from May to November. 
The death rate among mine and Uxo victims is now (2002-2003) about 16% and the same for 
both categories of accidents. Additionally 23% of the victims have to undergo amputations 
while 61% are classified as injured.  
 
Table 3.3: Place of accident 
 Mine Uxo 
In forest 50 % 14 % 
In village 4 % 41 % 
Rice field 10 % 16 % 
Near river 6 % 12 % 
On path 12 % 3 % 
Grazing field 4 % 6 % 
On mountain/hill 5 % 1 % 
Near military position 3 % 3 % 
On road 3 % 0 % 
Other 3 % 3 % 
 100 % 100 % 
Source: CMVIS National Census 
 
Forests seem to be dangerous places as 50% of the mine casualties report to have fallen 
victims there. As regards the Uxo casualties, the largest part of the accidents takes place in the 
village. However, a concept of the real threat represented by different locations or types of 
areas could only be established if the number of accidents was related to the total extent of the 
mined/ Uxo infested areas of these categories.  
 
3.3 Blocking infrastructure 
In Cambodia poor households are forced to take risks with mines/Uxo because of economic 
necessity. Families could face starvation if they were not willing to take risks, farming land 
that may be contaminated or gathering forest produce. About 2,300 villages have reported 
restricted access to neighboring communities, while significant numbers of villages reported 
restricted access to pagodas (1,487 villages), markets (1,334), health centers (1,312), and 




                                                 
20 CMAA (2004): Mine Action Achievements of the Kingdom of Cambodia 1992-2003, Executive Summary. 
21 CMAA (2004): Mine Action Achievements of the Kingdom of Cambodia 1992-2003, chapter 1.3.3.3. 
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The mines/Uxos had severe impact on the villagers22: 
– Not enough agricultural land 22% 
– High number of human casualties 19% 
– Gathering activities affected 18% 
– Not enough housing land 15%, 
– Experienced loss of livestock 14% 
– Difficult water access 12%. 
 
The most common constraints reported were as follows23: 
 
Restricted access to: Number of suspected areas Number of families affected 
Agricultural land 2,077 102,778 
Forests 2,000 172,878 
Pasture land 1,781 105,707 
Water sources 1,184 84,588 
 
 
                                                 
22 Level One Survey, referred in CMAC: Annual Report 2003, page 2. 
23 Source: CMAA Level One Survey (L1S) referred in Paterson and Vanna (2004): A Study of Capacity 
Development in Mine Action, Case Study of Cambodia (GICHD September 2004) page 20. 
 19
4. The mine action programme 
4.1 Visions and planning strategies 
Mine action is considered by the RGC as one of the top priorities for rehabilitation and 
development of the country. It has been fully integrated among Cambodia’s Millennium 
Development Goals and in its Poverty Reduction Strategy (NPRS).  
The long-term mission for mine action in Cambodia is, according to the National Mine Action 
Strategy 2004 (NMAS), to eliminate as soon as possible the risk of death or injury to 
individuals living in mined areas, to significantly reduce the negative socio-economic impact 
of landmines/ UXO on the population while achieving humanitarian and national development 
goals, in order to ensure the prioritisation for poor people and the rehabilitation and welfare of 
landmine victims in society and to comply with the international conventions on mine 
action.24 
For the foreseeable future, the primary focus of the mine action sector in Cambodia will most 
likely remain humanitarian in nature e.g. clearing mines and UXO to reduce the risks to human 
life. The humanitarian imperative has been and will stay the raison d’être of mine action.25 
The National Mine Action Strategy comprises the following visions26: 
− The medium-term vision is to move towards zero impact from land mines and UXO by 
2012, in order to enhance security, alleviate poverty and to sustain development, as 
ensured by clearing all severe/high risk suspected mined areas and developing 
intensive mine risk education for the medium and low suspected areas with mines and 
UXO. 
− The long-term vision is to have a Cambodia free from the negative humanitarian and 
socio-economic impacts of landmines/ UXO by 2020 by sustaining a national 
capability to address the problem in non-cleared and remote areas from 2012. 
The strategy is to clear the worst-affected areas to reduce as soon as possible to a negligible 
and nationally acceptable level, the risk of death or injury to individuals living in landmine/ 
Uxo-affected parts of the country, where access is denied to critical life-dependent resources, 
such as water and food crops for which there are no viable alternatives.  This reducing of the 
impact of mines/Uxo will be carried out as quickly as possible by increasing outputs coupled 
with improved targeting of most affected areas.27 
 
4.2 Clearance activities 
Mine action activities in Cambodia began during the United Nations Transitional Authority of 
Cambodia (UNTAC) era in 1992 with international technical and financial support. From 
1992 to December 2003 the various mine clearance operators had cleared a total area of 252 
km2. Figure 4.1 includes the areas reported from all the certified mine clearance agencies.28 
                                                 
24 CMAA: National Mine Action Strategy 2004, chapter 5. 
25 CMAA: National Mine Action Strategy 2004, chapter 4.2. 
26 CMAA: National Mine Action Strategy 2004, chapter 2.  
27 CMAA: National Mine Action Strategy 2004, chapter 4.2.1. 
28 Actually CMAC, HALO Trust, MAG, RCAF, but other agencies were involved in earlier years. 
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Figure 4.1: Areas cleared (ha) 1992-2003 and the mine action work plan for 2004. 
 
Source: CMAA29 
Currently, four main operators are involved in mine and UXO clearance: CMAC the national 
governmental operator, the international agencies HALO Trust and MAG, which constitute 
the 3 civilian operators, and the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces (RCAF)/Engineering 
Command Force.  
Parts of the areas reported by the RCAF are presumed to be combined survey and clearance of 
roads in support of rehabilitation works. Far higher rates of productivity are normal for such 
combined survey/clearance tasks, as most of the area is not in fact contaminated.  RCAF 
reported exceptional clearance activity in the years 2000, 2002 and 2003.  
An important task of mine clearance was carried out in the south of the province of Siem 
Reap from 1992 on, to give access to the main historical and religious site in the Kingdom of 
Cambodia, the Angkor area. 
In addition to the reduction of the human loss, a main goal for the mine action programme in 
Cambodia is to prioritise mined land for clearance according to socio-economic needs at the 
local level. Safe land for settlement and agricultural purposes will be distributed, contributing 
to the economic reintegration of landless populations in rural areas, and communities will be 
provided with access to essential services and infrastructure such as water resources, schools, 
hospitals and roads.  
The mine action strategy thus distinguishes between clearance of severely mined villages with 
high levels of casualties, and providing access to productive land improving the living 
conditions for poor people, de-mining of specific areas such as historical sites to promote 
development of the tourist industry, or clearing infrastructure such as roads allowing 
communication with other parts of the country. The programme aims at putting in place a 
community based, transparent, participative and decentralized process to identify those 
villages, families and persons that will be entitled to receive cleared lands. 
                                                 
29 CMAA (2004): Mine Action Achievements of the Kingdom of Cambodia 1992-2003, chapter 2.2.1. 
 21
 


























Figure 4.2: Areas cleared by civilian agencies in 2003. 
Figure 4.2 provides a distribution of the areas cleared in 2003 by types of land. The large 
majority, 65% of the clearance, is connected with agriculture and resettlement schemes of 
displaced people. Roads make up a significant proportion (19% and 313 km) and the 
remaining areas are clearance tasks connected to specific locations, public buildings, water 
supply, irrigation canals, temple areas etc.30 
The figures include only the civilian operators (CMAC, HALO, MAG) and their clearance of 
16.5 km2. Distribution on types of areas has not been obtained from RCAF, which activities 
comprised 24.4 km2 in 2003. The total area cleared in 2003 was thus 40.9 km2, which should 
be the largest annual achievement ever in mine action in Cambodia. 
The National Work Plan for 2004 comprises (without RCAF) clearance of the following 
areas31: 
– Agriculture: 550 ha 
– Resettlement: 426 ha 
– Agriculture and resettlement: 193 ha. 
– Casualty reduction: 105 ha. 
– Wells, ponds: 14 tasks. 
– Canals: 11 tasks. 
– Roads: 91 tasks, 29 km. 
– Bridges: 1 task. 
– Schools: 41 tasks. 
– Health centres: 5 tasks. 
– Commune offices: 6 tasks. 
– Other: 19 tasks. 
This amounts to an area of 19.9 km2 and with a contribution from RCAF of 9.7 km2, the area 
planned for clearance in 2004 comprises 29.6 km2 in total.32 
                                                 
30 Areas related to these clearance tasks have been estimated since the statistics mainly gives the number of 
tasks. 
31 CMAA (2004): Mine Clearance Analysis and Guidance 2004, chapter 2.2.3. 
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4.3 Assessment of targets and achievements 
Concerning casualties, the RGC is firmly committed towards zero impact from landmines and 
Uxo by 2012 as per pledges in the Ottawa Convention. A target of less than 280 civilian 
casualties has consequently to be reached in 2008 in order to be near zero in 2012. Based on a 
straightforward linear projection, however, the target for the number of casualties can hardly 
be met as foreseen. Indeed, despite of a reassuring decrease in 2003, an unexpected increase 
of civilian casualties occurred in 2004.33 
On mine clearance, the RGC is committed to ensure that at least 65% of the suspected areas 
will be cleared by the end of 2008 in order to have 100% of the suspected mined areas cleared 
by 2015. This is based, of course, on an assumption that the suspected, dangerous areas can be 
properly identified and duly targeted. The clearance targets are now based on the CMAA 
estimate that only 10% of the L1S areas are contaminated and have to be cleared. After this 
reduction, the objective of mine clearance pertains to about 425 km2.  
To reach this target an average of at least 30 km2 must be cleared every year as of 2003. This 
could be met given the actual capacity of the 4 participating clearance agencies, the problem 
is, however, that a large part of their clearance activity, as much as 36% in 2003, is conducted 
outside the designated (L1S) areas. It can actually be claimed that an important percentage of 
the clearance achieved should not be taken into account in the calculations since it has not 
been implemented in L1S’s suspected mined area.34  
In 2003 about 36% of cleared areas were outside the L1S.35 At the same time it is clear that 
L1S also failed to take into account important contaminated area. One explanation of the lack 
of coverage is that parts of some provinces were not populated at the time when the L1S team 
undertook its survey activities (year 2000-2002), and large scale population movements have 
been going on since. 
A slight increase in the annual clearance rate has been achieved over the last years, but despite 
this positive trend and even if the assumption of having only 10% of the L1S area 
contaminated is right, it is not sure that the target will be reached in 2015. The situation could 
demand an increase in the current clearance capacity.36  
Realistically it is anticipated that mine action operations will need to continue at a persistent 
and even reinforced level at least until 2020. Sustainable efforts will have to be maintained in 
clearance and mine risk education, especially for Uxo. Even beyond this period a reduced 
capability will probably be needed, with smaller and mobile de-mining teams to deal with 
specific clearance tasks and numerous Uxo, possibly for as long as a further 50 years.37 
In order to fulfil the goals immediate priority should be given to those areas which produce 
largest effect towards reducing the number of casualties. This will of course depend on the 
application of efficient planning tools including identification and prioritization mechanisms 
at the local level, by CMAA, the operators and the donors. CMAA has applied a set of criteria 
to measure the socio economic impact that mines/Uxo have on communities, ranking villages 
based on their impact score38 and grouping them into categories. This exercise has been 
                                                                                                                                                        
32 CMAA (2004): Mine Clearance Analysis and Guidance 2004, chapter 2.1.1. 
33 CMAA: Mine Clearance Analysis and Guidance 2004, chapter 4.1.2. 
34 CMAA: Mine Clearance Analysis and Guidance 2004, chapter 4.1.2. 
35 CMAA: Mine Clearance Analysis and Guidance 2004, chapter 1.3. 
36 CMAA: Mine Clearance Analysis and Guidance 2004, chapter 4.1. 
37 CMAA: National Mine Action Strategy 2004, chapter 1.2. 
38 Score is based on three major impact factors; the number of recent victims, the facilities and livelihood areas 
to which mines block access, and the type of contamination. 
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conducted on the suspected 425 km2 to distribute the area on the impact categories “severe, 
high, medium and low” and geographically on provinces.39 
The Five Year Plan assumes that priority is given to clear severe and high impact areas before 
medium and low in order to alleviate the casualty rate.40  A total of about 300 km2 are thus 
presumably causing the main part of the above mentioned accidents problems and will 
consequently be attended to first.  
The problem with this reduced area is, however, the same as with the total L1S area: It cannot 
be claimed to cover the total suspected area in the country. In total it may not exaggerate the 
extent of the priority contaminated area, but it is still a fact that considerable amounts of 
clearance activities are going on at the outside. Data from the operators (HALO and CMAC) 
indicate high-priority mined areas amounting to about 260 km2 as of 2004,41 and comparison 
between the CMAA priority area and the operators’ data reveals a rather different distribution 
on provinces as shown in table 4.1. 
 CMAA severe  Operators CBA 
 and high categories data estimate 
Battambang 96.2 46.0 72.2 
Pursat 51.5 2.7 38.6 
Siem Reap 41.9 51.1 38.3 
Otdar Meanchey 28.1 41.6 31.2 
Banteay Meanchey 27.8 75.9 56.9 
Pailin 18.2 2.3 13.7 
Kampong Thom 4.3 3.1 3.2 
Kampong Cham 6.9 20.1 15.0 
Kampong Speu 1.7 2.6 1.9 
Kracheh 2.2 0.0 1.7 
Preah Vihear 1.1 18.5 13.9 
Others 22.8 0.0 17.1 
Total 302.8 263.8 303.7 
 
 Table 4.1: Priority contaminated area in km2, information from CMAA and the operators. 
The operators have identified considerably more contaminated areas in provinces like Preah 
Vihear, Kampong Cham, Banteay Meanchey, Odtar Meanchey and Siem Reap than the L1S 
based CMAA estimate on severe and high impact areas. Provinces like Battambang, Pursat 
and Pailin have on the other hand much less priority mined area in the data from the operators 
compared to the CMAA estimates. 
In a recent report (Griffin and Keeley 2004) the mine/Uxo contamination in Cambodia has 
been assessed based on information of the L1S, US bombing records, land cover mapping, 
areas already cleared etc. Suspected areas are consecutively reduced to a total of about 450 
km2, indicated as the total likely area contaminated agricultural ground with economic value. 
It is also stated that further reductions may be possible.42 
It is strongly recommended to revise the L1S estimate of contaminated area. The mapping 
tools already at disposal with CMAA combined with the scheduled reinforcement of the 
planning capacity at the local level (see chapter 4.4.2) should improve the possibility of 
conducting this appraisal. Area revisions should also to a greater extent than the L1S take into 
                                                 
39 CMAA (2004): Five Year Mine Action Plan 2004-2008, chapter 3.1.1 
40 CMAA (2004): Five Year Mine Action Plan 2004-2008, chapter 3.1.3. 
41 Source: National Mine Action Database 
42 Griffin and Keeley (December 2004): Joint Evaluation of Mine Action in Cambodia, page 10 and Annex 2.1. 
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account information also from the operators, while such data may not always give the 
complete picture. 
Clearance of mine and Uxo contaminated areas constitutes together with mine risk education 
the principal action parameters of a mine action programme. As an important input to this cost 
benefit analysis there will be a need for some estimate of the total priority area to be cleared 
in the country. The cost benefit analysis should also to the largest possible extent be 
conducted at a disaggregated level, targeting the provinces in the first instant.  
Based on the afore mentioned factors the CBA proposes a preliminary estimate of the high 
priority contaminated land, consisting of the CMAA/L1S severe and high priority categories 
for the provinces where these constitute the largest area and the data from the operators for 
the provinces where these are found to be the most extensive. Finally these estimates are 
reduced with 25% so as to comply with the CMAA/L1S appraisal that there are about 300 
km2 of severe and high priority contaminated areas in the country. The distribution of this 
area on provinces will, however, be different in the CBA estimate both from CMAA/L1S and 
the operators’ data (table 4.1).  
The CBA estimate thus attempts to take into account the fact that the L1S estimate could fail 
to target contaminated areas at some locations, while the operators also may fall short of 
recognising areas, particularly in regions where they have no activity. 
In the further analysis (see chapter 5) this area will be considered as a principal source of the 
mine and (partially) the Uxo accidents in the country. It must, however, be realised that this 
estimate is subject to shortcomings, and better ones could easily be plugged into the analysis 





2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Total clearance 
1992-2003 
Clearance (ha) 442 393 353 310  3277 
Mine victims 180 148 105 109 129  
Battambang 
Uxo victims 78 58 81 60 122  
Clearance (ha) 1 7 114 150  312 
Mine victims 15 13 8 17 15  
Pursat 
Uxo victims 25 16 12 15 24  
Clearance (ha) 139 189 182 107  1813 
Mine victims 10 13 6 6 3  
Siem Reap 
Uxo victims 32 21 43 49 16  
Clearance (ha) 210 375 398 224  1229 
Mine victims 41 37 37 54 27  
Otdar Meanchey 
Uxo victims 25 31 41 43 48  
Clearance (ha) 419 354 320 231  3831 
Mine victims 110 105 110 87 98  
Banteay Meanchey 
Uxo victims 12 28 25 33 36  
Clearance (ha) 4 73 150 70  297 
Mine victims 47 40 54 55 50  
Pailin 
Uxo victims 16 17 8 24 48  
Clearance (ha) 25 1 7 5  419 
Mine victims 0 12 8 10 4  
Kampong Cham 
Uxo victims 29 37 70 28 72  
Clearance (ha) 53 23 75 75  225 
Mine victims 15 17 25 10 10  
Preah Vihear 
Uxo victims 52 35 40 31 24  
Mine victims 443 434 366 362 341  Total 
Uxo victims 389 390 475 410 550  
Total victims  832 824 841 772 891  
Total clearance (ha)  3225 2188 3483 4177 296643 25174 
 
Table 4.2: Impact on accidents rates from the clearance of contaminated areas. 
Clearance of dangerously contaminated land should have an apparent impact on the accident 
rate in the neighbouring areas which were exposed to the risk. Even though many random 
factors may influence the accident numbers for an individual year, the effect should be visible 
at least when looking at statistics for several following years or through the analysis of a 
number of similar cases at different locations and/or periods.   
I table 4.2 the clearance activity at the provincial level for the years 2000 to 2003 and during 
the whole period 1992-2003 has been related to the recorded casualty rates in the province for 
mine and Uxo incidents separately.  
Even in the provinces with the highest number of casualties and also the largest amount of 
clearance activity, Battambang and Banteay Meanchey, it is difficult to find a clear decreasing 
trend in the mine-accident frequency. Battambang definitely experienced a drop in 2000-02, 
but the rate is on the increase again especially in 2004. 
In Pailin there was no clearance at all recorded before year 2000, but the concentrated effort 
over the last 3 years has not resulted in any significant drop in the mine casualty rate. In Preah 
                                                 
43 Planned 
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Vihear the clearing likewise started in the year 2000 while the accident rate is rather 
fluctuating over the later years.  
Siem Reap shows more of the pattern one could expect in response to substantial efforts of 
clearance activities, but the accident figures are rather small here over the whole period 
considered.  
For the Uxo accident it is even more difficult to disentangle effects from clearance. In many 
provinces it is heavily on the rise despite the clearance activity. 
The first objection to the analysis could be to point out the difficulty in telling from the 
figures in table 4.2 what the accident rates would have been without any ongoing clearance 
activity. They could presumably have been much higher, so that the clearance efforts at least 
contributed to mitigate the even more disastrous potential impacts from the contaminated 
areas. In some places this might be an explanation, and a more thorough analysis would be 
needed to identify where and why this is the case. A consequence would be that substantially 
larger clearance efforts are needed in order to reach the agreed on goals for reduction in 
casualty rates. 
It is by now generally admitted, however, that while the clearance of minefields can 
contribute to reduce the number of mine accidents, other measures like mine risk education 
will have to be strengthened in order to reduce the number of Uxo casualties. 
Nonetheless, it is disconcerting to be able to trace so few clear impacts all over, and the 
problem could be that the analysis is conducted on a too high level, district or commune could 
be more appropriate. Other time periods could also be selected, for example 1996-2000, 
which demonstrates the largest decline in accidents rates in recent years from about 1750 to 
800 (figure 3.3). This was apparently also achieved with smaller efforts than have been 
deployed later on. The clearance rate of about 20 km2 a year in 1996 was declining to about 
16 km2 in 1999, compared with areas between 20 km2 and up to over 40 km2 in recent years. 
The variations are smaller, however, when looking at the output for the civilian operators only 
(figure 4.1). Such studies could be launched as more detailed and better data becomes 
available.44 
In any case the mine action programme in Cambodia is not an exception here. Concrete 
studies demonstrating the relation between mine action activities and risk reduction are indeed 
very scarce. The GICHD/UNDP Study of Socio-Economic Approaches to Mine Action states 
that “in the case of risk reduction, the study team did not come across a single report that 
adequately documents how much the accident rate has fallen due to mine action. While it is 
clear that the numbers of landmine and Uxo accidents have fallen in many countries having 
mine action programmes, it remains unclear how much of the decline is the result of mine 
action.”45 
It is furthermore stated that decline in accident rates may be the outcome of a variety of 
factors: 
– people learning to avoid contaminated areas, 
– “spontaneous” declines in risky behaviour, 
– reflecting the end of large population movements caused by conflict and 
remigration, 
                                                 
44 The clearance data on provinces used in table 4.2 are not complete, RCAF is lacking, and even the data for the 
civilian agencies do not add up correctly to the official amount of clearance undertaken in the period. 
45 GICHD/UNDP (2001): A Study of Socio-Economic Approaches to Mine Action, page 9. 
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in addition to the main action parameters of a programme:   
– clearance of mine- and Uxo infested areas, and 
– mine risk education and awareness. 
 
The lack of specific knowledge of the impact on such factors on the accident frequency and 
for the success of mine action programmes in general calls for a more thorough analytical 
approach. Studies in this field should, however, be based on experience and data from a 
number of countries and cases over an extended period of time.  
 
4.4 Organisation and main stakeholders 
4.4.1 National Level 
The Cambodian Mine Action and Victims Assistance Authority (CMAA) was established in 
September 2000 placed under the direct leadership of the Prime Minister. CMAA currently 
acts as co-ordinator in the mine action sector at the national level, charged with the 
implementation of national planning in the mine action sector and with the coordination of 
information and communication processes, involving all stakeholders; government, service 
providers and donors. Prior to the creation of CMAA and from the start of mine action 
in1992, this role was assumed by the Cambodia Mine Action Centre (CMAC), which is now 
among the service providers for mine action. 
According to the decree CMAA is charged with developing policy guidelines and strategic 
visions on de-mining and UXO clearance and assistance to mine victims, regulation and 
monitoring of activities and accreditation of organisations involved. Its responsibilities also 
comprise the development of guidelines on the management of land use on post clearance 
etc.46 
CMAA has laid groundwork for coordination by issuing key documents on the assessment of 
the contamination problem, a strategy for addressing the problem, and a multi-year action 
plan. Still the National Work Plan 2004 is merely an edition of the collected work plans for 
the different clearance agencies.47 This underlines the actual independent role of the clearance 
agencies acting together with their different donors, and the Government through RCAF. 
Coordination is slight and all the funding for clearance and other operations is channelled 
directly to the agencies.    
In one important respect, the scope of CMAA extends beyond traditional mine action to 
embrace post-clearance land use, one of the most important issues in Cambodia today. Efforts 
to address these post-clearance land use concerns led to the formation of land use planning 
units at the local level. 
4.4.2 Local level participation in planning 
The responsibility for the selection of individual mine action tasks will, according to plans, in 
the future be handled essentially at the provincial level to ensure compliance with national 
priorities and humanitarian purposes. This is consistent with the decentralisation process 
promoted by the RGC, and is vital for relevance, success and sustainability of mine action 
                                                 
46 Kingdom of Cambodia: Legal Framework of Cambodian Mine Action and Victims Assistance Authority 
CMAA. 
47 Principally the civilian agencies, CMAC, HALO, MAG. 
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activities. Provincial authorities will act as an interface among de-mining operators, 
development NGOs and local authorities, communities and target beneficiaries.48 
As part of sub-national planning, there will be a requirement for mine action activities to be 
endorsed by provincial authorities as part of their provincial development plans. Transparent, 
nationally owned and provincial-level led mechanisms need to be in place to address pre-
clearance land allocation and post-clearance land use issues through the national regulations 
and mechanisms. 
Authorities in the most mine-affected provinces set in 1999 up Provincial Sub-Committees 
(PSC), chaired by the vice-governor and including a technical support unit, the Land Use 
Planning Unit (LUPU). In 2003 a framework more in line with the government’s 
decentralisation policies was proposed, introducing new bodies the Provincial Mine Action 
Committees (PMAC) and the Mine Action Planning Units (MAPU) at the district level.  
The PRDC/LUPU process has been led by provincial authorities in close co-operation with 
mine clearance operators, and development agencies. It defines, in advance the number and 
the identities of beneficiaries. The process is community based, participative and 
decentralized, aimed at identifying in a transparent way those eligible to receive cleared lands.  
So far this process has been active and operational in five of the most affected provinces: 
Battambang, Banteay Meanchey, Oddar Meanchey, Preah Vihear and Pailin.  
The LUPU mechanism has worked well and, has reduced the number of incidents in which 
land has been seized by powerful interests after clearance or where cleared land lies idle 
because of ownership dispute. Still it is clear that not all de-mining agencies take their 
priorities from the LUPU process. RCAF responds to requests mainly from national ministries 
or provincial governors, working on national priorities determined from the top rather than on 
bottom-up priorities identified by communities and development NGOs through the LUPU 
process.  
Other civilian operators regard the LUPU process as too easily ‘hijacked’ and consult their 
own information in addition to the LUPU lists. These operators also have to respond to 
requests from their funding donors, which are not always coordinated with the outcomes of 
the LUPU process. 
The light-handed coordination of mine action can be illustrated by the fact that 36% of the 
areas cleared in 2003 by the 3 civilian operators were outside the National Work Plan (NWP), 
even though this plan in its conception was a mere juxtaposition of the plans submitted by the 
same operators. At the same time 43% of the areas designated in the NWP had not been 
cleared by the end of the year. CMAA expresses concern about the difficulties encountered by 
all de-mining agencies in the field to follow their work plans, a situation which can create 
difficulties to plan at the community level.49   
Due to the transitional situation in 2003 LUPU was not able to provide CMAA with reports 
regarding the 2004 NWP. Reports from the provinces are, however, expected received for the 
2005 NWP from the new MAPU.50  
4.4.3 Operations level 
Mine and Uxo clearance operations within Cambodia are currently operating with a 
workforce of some 4000 personnel, with in addition hundreds of others in mine action 
                                                 
48 CMAA: National Mine Action Strategy 2004, chapter 4.2.3. 
49 CMAA: Mine Clearance Analysis and Guidance 2004, chapter 1.1.1. 
50 CMAA: Mine Clearance Analysis and Guidance 2004, chapter 3.2.3. 
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operations such as mine risk education across governmental and NGOs institutions. The 4 
principal actors in mine and Uxo clearance are CMAC, HALO Trust, MAG and RCAF. 
Created in 1992, the Cambodian Mine Action Centre (CMAC) is the government’s mine-
action operator. After the turmoil in 1999-2000, which resulted in a new setup of mine action 
with policy and regulatory functions clearly separated from implementation, CMAC was 
reorganised as a service provider only, with responsibilities for mine/Uxo clearance, survey, 
mine risk education, training etc. A new top management team was in-place by 2001, and by 
the end of 2003 many former weaknesses had been rectified. CMAC has now a staff in excess 
of 2,300. 
HALO Trust, an international group, started operations in Cambodia in 1992, undertaking 
emergency survey and de-mining. HALO has grown to become the second largest civilian 
mine clearance organisation in Cambodia. In line with HALO Trust’s overall philosophy, its 
programme concentrates principally on de-mining. HALO expanded rapidly in size from 560 
staff in 1999 to 900 in 2001, to reach almost 1,100 personnel today. 
The Mines Advisory Group (MAG) is an international non-profit NGO, based in the United 
Kingdom and operating in Cambodia since 1992. MAG employs about 500 national personnel 
at all levels of the organisation, including about 100 women de-miners and about 70 amputee 
de-miners.  
The Royal Cambodian Armed Forces (RCAF) engineering brigades have long been active in 
de-mining, but it was not until 1999, shortly after the end of the civil war that they were 
accredited as a humanitarian de-mining organisation. The capacity is significant, with over 
690 de-miners. Personnel have received equipment and training from Japan, France, China, 
and USA as well as from UNTAC.  
The commander of the military de-mining units is one of the three deputy secretary generals 
of CMAA and RCAF has announced its intention to coordinate more fully with CMAA. 
However, RCAF is not yet a full partner within the national mine action programme, and not 
all its de-mining activities fall within the policy sphere of CMAA. Information on activities is 
scarce, and most CMAA statistics on clearance etc at detailed level is presented without any 
contribution from RCAF.  
Since at least 2000 RCAF has been active in conducting survey and clearance operations in 
support of road construction projects financed in the main by the Asian Development Bank 
(ADB), putting it in competition with private de-mining firms and, on occasion, with HALO 
Trust and CMAC. 
Other agencies with local affiliation accredited for de-mining have come to the fore recently 
competing for de-mining tasks on the private market, the Khmer Mine Action Service 
(KMAS), TADS and MUA.  
There is little standardization among the mine/Uxo clearance operators as of the approach to 
the tasks, the set-up of field work teams, techniques and types of equipment in use etc. This 
makes comparison of quality of services and costs complicated, in combination with the fact 
that many of the clients and donors are not too concerned with specifying tasks in a way that 
can reveal unit costs of different types of services (clearance tasks, various kinds of areas etc).   
A variety of other development non-governmental and international organisations are 




The four operators actually engaged in mine/Uxo clearance under the Cambodian mine action 
programme, CMAC, HALO, MAG and RCAF are rather independent, subject to slight 
coordination by CMAA. Competition is limited, as there is no regular practice of putting 
larger clearance tasks out on tender. Each operator to a large extent benefits from its proper 
regular sources for funding, comprising: 
– Bi-lateral funding from the international donor community sometimes through 
NGOs (HALO, CMAC, MAG).  
– The multilateral UNDP trust fund (CMAC).  
– The Government of Cambodia (RCAF and CMAC) among others under its budget 
for agriculture.  
The funding comprises direct payment for specific assignments in area clearance, mine risk 
education etc, as well as support in the form of equipment donations, technical assistance etc. 
All funding for mine action including clearance and mine risk education is channelled from 
the donors directly to the operating agencies. CMAA, the national regulatory and coordinating 
authority disposes solely over funds for its proper activities, for the operational expenses of its 
headquarters, its administrative staff etc. 
CMAA’s operations are financed partly through UNDP, by donors (technical assistance, 
equipment etc), and by the Government (salary for national staff etc). The surveys and 
















CMAC 9.25 4.10 5.15 0.10  
HALO 3.45 3.45 - - 0.29 
MAG 3.00 3.00 - -  
RCAF  - -   
CMAA    0.06  
CMVIS      
Others      
Total 15.70     
2004      
CMAC 9.83 5.02 4.52 0.15 16.00 
HALO 3.77 3.77 - - 0.26 
MAG 3.76 3.76 - -  
RCAF 4.60 - - 4.60  
CMAA   0.20 0.07  
CMVIS   0.16   
Others      
Total 21.95     
 
Table 4.3: Funding of the mine action programme in Cambodia, US$ millions. 
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Some donors have expressed change in their priorities and have indicated a future decline in 
funding levels. At this time it is important for the mine action programme to diversify the 
funding base and supplement the current donors.  
To sustain the current high levels of mine action interventions beyond 2012 external funding 
and other support for mine action in Cambodia may progressively move from being mainly 
external grant aid to a situation where government or commercial funding prevails.  Then 
mine and UXO clearance will be undertaken mostly by government agencies on a call-out 
basis or contracted out by the government to commercial firms. Commercial contracts/sub-
contracts, executed by commercial, NGOs and/or government operators, will supplement call 
out work. Mine/UXO awareness will be done primarily through the school system and 
government-sponsored public education campaigns. Victim assistance will be primarily 
handled through the governmental and non-governmental medical and social welfare 
organisations. 
 
4.6 Information and databases 
4.6.1 Mine and Uxo victims 
The Cambodian Mine/Uxo Victim Information System (CMVIS) was initiated in 1994 as an 
organisation of the Cambodian Red Cross and Handicap International, Belgium. Since then it 
has moved to cover the whole country in the year 2001. Incidents are reported on a monthly 
basis, and additionally trends can be traced back to 1979. 
Reports for the last 3 years 2001-2003 have been standardized to facilitate comparison and 
trend analysis. Information is fairly detailed. Information collection is based on a network of 
reporters receiving a compensation of US$ 5 for each (human?) casualty reported. 
CMVIS neither claims nor intends to capture every occurrence of mine/Uxo accidents in 
Cambodia. Presently it claims to capture between 80 and 90 % of all casualties. The large 
efforts to ensure 100% coverage are believed not to justify the resource input needed.51 
In spite of the excellent information of on mine/Uxo casualties and incidents there are lacking 
elements in the analysis that could help direct the clearance activity towards the most risky 
locations. The CMVIS statistics could to a larger extent form basis for improved assessments 
of which parts of the extensive mined area in the country that are generating the bulk of the 
mine/Uxo accidents, representing a danger to the people now and in future years with 
expected population movements etc.  
 
4.6.2 Mine Action Database 
By 2003 data on clearance and U.S. bombing was added to the L1S data, with the result 
termed the National Mine Action Database (NMAD). Actually NMAD is the primary 
repository of all mine related information within the Kingdom of Cambodia, and has the 
capability to produce mapping products, reports, and statistics for all stakeholders.  
NMAD provides CMAA with information to facilitate planning, management and reporting 
of mine action operations.  It provides data-collection capability, tools for analysing and 
examining this data (including GIS), and the means to disseminate the processed information.  
                                                 
51 CMVIS (2001): Mine and Uxo Casualties in Cambodia 2000, page 9-10. 
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NMAD now uses the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) which has 
been customised to meet the specific requirements of the mine action programme in 
Cambodia. Using IMSMA reporting functionalities, CMAA will report quarterly to the 
Government, donors and United Nations Agencies on basis of reports from de-mining 
operators on a regular basis.  
The CMAA database on cleared areas needs to be consolidated, so that it can provide official 
figures for clearance on location (province, district), types of areas, techniques etc for the 
individual years since the start of the mine action programme. As of today this information 
exists on different files which can be incomplete and inconsistent. 
More information about the cost of clearance and of conducting other mine action activities 
should be required from the operators. As a first approach the operators could supply 
information on clearance time (in hours) of different tasks as an element to the CMAA 
database on cleared areas (see also chapter 7). 
The extent of the mine/Uxo infested area in Cambodia is disputed; in particular what parts of 
it should be given priority for clearance. It is strongly recommended to revise the estimates of 
the contaminated area as basis for further analysis of risk reduction etc (see chapter 5). 
 
4.6.3 Socio-economic information 
From 1992 to 2000 socio economic information was scattered and difficult to compare since 
the criteria had not been the same for all operators.  As a result few reliable data were 
published.  
Socio economic data from operators have been collected with the forms put in the guidelines 
issued by the CMAA in 2003. Unfortunately, the relevant tables have not been 
comprehensively filled in by the operators, as some data were difficult to find the first year of 
implementation.52 
The CMAA Socio-economic Cluster, established in January 2004, has been set up to 
coordinate this data gathering. The CMAA Socio Economic Guidelines were discussed and 
adopted at workshops gathering all stakeholders in December 2004. 
The Socio-economic Cluster should in particular have a responsibility with following up the 
cost-benefit analysis.  
 
                                                 
52 CMAA: Mine Clearance Analysis and Guidance 2004, chapter 2.2. 
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5. Reducing the human loss 
5.1 Accidents risk 
The Cambodian National Mine Action Strategy 2004 states that clearance of the worst-
affected areas will be given priority to reduce as soon as possible the risk of death or injury to 
individuals living in landmine/Uxo -affected areas. This reduction of the impact of mines/Uxo 
will be carried out as quickly as possible by increasing outputs coupled with improved 
targeting of the most affected areas.53 According to the Strategy the current distribution of 
existing mine clearance capacities in the country could be able to clear the remaining parts of 
the severely of contaminated land by 2012-2015. It further targets a decrease in the number of 
mine and Uxo accidents towards a minimum at the end of the same period.  
Considering a specific mine- and Uxo infested area; the effect of clearance on accident risk 
reduction will depend on the danger this area represents to the local community, visitors, and 
particularly to people moving in. The number of accidents and incidents experienced recently 
may give an indication of this, but accident rates at the local level can be relatively small 
numbers, subject to random variation from a year to another.  
Some measure of the actual threat an area constitutes could be based on experience over many 
years or from other places under similar circumstances, identifying concrete risk factors 
related to the type of mined area, its proximity to large populations, the obstruction it 
represents to important activities and infrastructure etc. Given certain conditions one should 
not have to wait for a sufficient number of accidents to take place before moving into action, 
but as indicated (chapter 4.3) studies demonstrating this connection are scarce in Cambodia 
and elsewhere. 
Furthermore it is generally admitted that while the clearance of minefields can reduce the 
number of mine accidents, other measures like mine risk education will have to be 
strengthened in order to reduce the number of Uxo casualties. In this cost benefit analysis it is 
therefore assumed that while reductions in the mine accidents rate can be achieved through 
clearance of suspected areas, only 30% of the Uxo victims will be affected by clearance. The 
remaining 70% of the Uxo problem will have to be addressed otherwise.   
Finally, on a realistic assumption, after clearance of these areas an estimated 10% of the mine 
and Uxo accidents may still persist, not on the cleared land, but on low priority or outside 
areas that failed to be identified at the outset. 
For this cost benefit analysis a specific estimate of the high priority contaminated land is 
proposed (discussed in chapter 4.3). It consists of the CMAA/L1S severe and high priority 
categories for the provinces where these constitute the largest areas, and of the data from the 
operators for the provinces where these are the most extensive. The resulting figure has then 
been reduced by 25% so as to end up in line with the CMAA/L1S estimate of total severe and 
high priority contaminated land in Cambodia, which is about 300 km2.  
In the further analysis this area will be considered the principal source of mine and Uxo 
(30%) accidents in the country and the individual provinces, while underlining that the 
estimate is preliminary, to be exchanged for a better one when such data become available. 
It has been difficult to trace any clear trend in the development of accident rates for the last 
years on the national or the provincial level (see chapter 4.3). It is therefore suggested to base 
the accident rate on an average for the 4 last years 2001-2004. Including all the mine 
                                                 
53 CMAA (2004): National Mine Action Strategy 2004, chapter 4.2.1. 
 34
accidents and 30% of the Uxo accidents, this will amount to an average of 513 casualties 
representing the “actual” accidents level in the country. 
It is further presumed that this casualty rate can be reduced progressively through clearance of 
the contaminated areas described above comprising a total of 304 km2, while retaining the 
assumption that 10% of the accidents will “linger on” as a consequence for example of 

























Figure 5.1: The annual number of casualties related to the extent of the mined area. 
 
Figure 5.1 illustrates the presumed connection between the casualty rate and the extent of the 
mined area. According to this model the identified priority mined area of 304 km2 generates 
513 mine and Uxo casualties annually, and this is supposed to describe the current situation in 
the country. Clearance of contaminated land entails declines in the number of casualties; a 
remaining mined area of 200 km2 for example would, according to figure 5.1, be expected to 
cause 355 victims on an annual basis.   
As an average for the whole country, clearance of 1 km2 will reduce the casualty rate with 1.5 
mine/Uxo victims annually, and clearance of 1 km2 now will equivalently reduce the number 
of accidents with 15 in total over a 10-years period. The model further assumes that clearance 
of all the priority areas will not reduce the number of casualties to 0, since 10% or 51 











Table 5.1: Clearance efficiency at the provincial level. 
 
Suspected 
area in km2. 
Mine casualties + 





Victims reduction  
annually 
per cleared km2. 
Reduction in 
a 10 years 
period 
Provinces 
a b c = 10%* b d =(b-c)/a e = d *10 
Battambang 72 147 15 1.8 18
Pursat 39 18 2 0.4 4
Siem Reap 38 17 2 0.4 4
Otdar Meanchey 31 51 5 1.5 15
Banteay Meanchey 57 109 11 1.7 17
Pailin 14 57 6 3.8 38
Kampong Thom 3 8 1 2.2 22
Kampong Cham 15 24 2 1.4 14
Kampong Speu 2 7 1 3.5 35
Kracheh 2 9 1 4.7 47
Preah Vihear 14 25 3 1.6 16
Others 17 37 4 2.0 20
Total 304 513 51 1.5 15
 
The same approach has in Table 5.1 been applied on data disaggregated to the provincial 
level. Information of the suspected area in each province (a) and the annual number of 
mine/Uxo casualties (b), together with the assumption that 10% of the accidents (c)54 still 
persists after the suspected area (a) has been cleared, has been used to calculate the expected 
reduction in casualty numbers as a result of the clearance activities (d).55 The figures in this 
column thus show the impact from clearance of 1 km2 of priority area towards reduction of 
the number of casualties actually experienced in that province. This factor (d) can be called 
the “clearance efficiency rate.” The reduction over a 10 years’ period from clearing 1 km2 
(e)56 is equivalent with the annual reduction from clearing 10 km2.  
The table reveals some significant differences among the provinces regarding the clearance 
efficiency rate. When the principal objective is to reduce the number of mine/Uxo casualties 
as quickly as possible within limited budgets, it appears that resources for clearance activities 
could be spent more efficiently when directed to certain provinces as compared with others. 
In Pailin a relatively high number of accidents (57) appear to be generated by a fairly limited 
extent of mined area (14 km2). This constellation results in a rather high clearance efficiency 
rate, a reduction of 3.8 victims annually or 38 victims over a 10 years’ period for each km2 
cleared. Pailin is among the seriously affected provinces regarding accidents, while clearance 
started only in the year 2000. 
Among the accident prone provinces where large scale clearance has been going on since the 
beginning of the mine action programme, Battambang and Banteay Meanchey also come out 
with clearance efficiency rates above the average. Battambang is exposed to a level of mine 
and Uxo accidents, which is for most years by far much higher than in any other province in 
Cambodia, and the bulk of the Five Year Plan priority areas are also located there. 
                                                 
54 c  =10% of  b 
55 d = (b-c)/a 
56 e  = d * 10 
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Siem Reap and Pursat appear to come out on the lower side regarding clearance efficiency 
rates, indicating larger extents of suspected areas as compared to more moderate accident 
levels there. 
The three provinces Kampong Thom, Kampong Speu and Kracheh all have high clearance 
efficiency rates. These are provinces, however, where Uxo accidents dominate completely; 
altogether there were 3 mine accidents and 55 Uxo accidents in these 3 provinces combined in 
2004. Their high efficiency rates as observed here are thus conditioned on the assumption that 
land clearance activities can have an impact on at least 30% of their present Uxo accidents 
level. Kampong Cham which had 4 mine casualties and 72 Uxo casualties alone in 2004 
comes out with a lower efficiency rate, because more contaminated area has been identified 
there. 
Table 5.1 represents an attempt to locate regions or areas where clearance can be expected to 
have more significant impacts on the accident rate, and conversely where it could be a costly 
task, contributing only in the long run towards reduction of the number of casualties. The 
conclusions will of course depend on the quality of the data input; here in particular the 
estimates of the extent of the priority mined area and its distribution on provinces. 
Furthermore the conclusions will be valid in cases when the accidents are found to be widely 
and evenly distributed over the whole extent of the priority area identified in the province. 
Since most provinces are large there might, however, be specific clearance tasks with higher 
efficiency rates in some places than in others. Still, this would necessarily have to be evened 
out by low efficiency tasks in other localities, which should then be reclassified so as not to 
appear among the high priority impact areas.  
In this way the suspected area could be progressively reduced or put into appropriate priority 
categories. For the time being, however, the clearance efficiency estimates in table 5.1 may 
have to pass on a preliminary basis. 
 
5.2 Productive value 
The appraisal of the gains from mine action towards reduced human loss will be based on 
calculations of the potential contributions from an average Cambodian mine victim to the 
productive activities of the country. Furthermore an estimate of the value of leisure time will 
be added. This must not, however, in any ways be conceived of as the value of a human life. 
Still it is in line with benefit calculations regularly undertaken by other types of initiatives 
aimed at saving lives and reducing accidents risk, for example in road safety programmes. 
The average, annual household income levels in rural areas in provinces affected by 
mine/Uxo accidents can be ranged between US$ 300 and 700.57 For adult victims it can be 
assumed that the family breadwinners are the ones most exposed to mine/Uxo accidents risks. 
Males are the most frequently represented among the mine/Uxo casualties, while women 
victims may come from women-headed households (table 3.2). The typical adult victim’s 
potential for income generation could thus be fixed rather towards the upper level, and a share 
of non-marketed subsistence production value will also be added.  
This cost benefit analysis will thus be based on an annual income of US$ 1000 per adult mine 
victim. By using figures for average incomes unemployment rates will not have to be taken 
into account. Unemployment is a complicated issue in rural Cambodia, where a large share of 
                                                 
57 Asian Development Bank (2001): The North-western Rural Development Project, page 3. 
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the population works as unpaid farm labour, being productive while not receiving any money 
remuneration.  
An average adult mine/Uxo victim could have a potential revenue-generating life-time of 35 
years. For a child the average life expectancy is estimated to 45 years, including 5 years of 
non-productivity in the beginning.  
In addition to the productive value (contribution to GNP) a value of leisure time has been 
added, stipulated to an equal amount, US$ 1000 per year, children and adults on the same 
level. 
The country’s National Poverty Reduction Strategy confirms the government’s aims to 
achieve a sustainable real rate of economic growth of 6% to 7% per year, to reach an income 
per head of US$320 at the end of 2005. This represents an annual growth rate in real income 
per head of 3.5%.58  
The last goal, the growth in income per person, will be the proper basis for an estimate of the 
increase in production generating capacity expected for a Cambodian over the coming years, 
the potential revenue lost in case of mine victims. For the first 10 years the economic growth 
per capita is thus fixed at 3.5%, in a longer perspective, however, the analysis will settle with 
an estimate of 2.5% growth. 
Estimates of future economic growth will enter into the analysis in different ways: First it will 
affect the future production potential for a typical mine/Uxo victim of today over his/her 
lifetime that is to say over an estimated span of 35 years for adult victims and 45 years for 
children from now on. Secondly it must be taken into account that without clearance new 
accidents will continue to occur also in future years, a period of 20 years has been considered 
here. Because of the economic growth victims in those future years will have reached a higher 
income level than today’s victims. The potential production lost with those victims will 
therefore have to be calculated starting from the actual income level in the year when the 
accident happened. 
The analysis furthermore takes into account the difference in frequency of adults and children 
among mine and the Uxo victims (with an average for all provinces) where, according to the 
assumptions described above, only 30% of the Uxo casualties have been included.  
The subsequent calculations result in an economic loss concerning a fatal casualty amounting 
to about US$ 25,000 on the average when today’s productivity level is the starting point. The 
annual production value the victim could have contributed has then been discounted over the 
victim’s potential lifetime at a 10% rate. For future victims this value will be increasing with 
the level of economic growth.  
 
5.3 Medical costs 
The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) estimates an average hospital stay for 
patients with mine injuries to be 3 weeks, amputees stay almost 5 weeks and require on the 
average 4 operations as well as antibiotics and blood transfusions. In addition amputees 
should have prostheses replaced every 3 to 5 years or every 6 months for children. These 
medical costs have been estimated (G Harris 2000) to US$ 550 on an annual basis.59 
                                                 
58 Council for Social Development (2002): National Poverty Reduction Strategy 2003-2005, chapter 4.1.1. 
59 G Harris (2000): The Economics of Landmine Clearance. Case Study of Cambodia (Journal of International 
Development 12 – 2000) page 221. 
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In the CMVIS statistics victims are classified into the categories of deaths, injured and 
amputations. For the years 2002 and 2003 the victims are distributed as follows: 
– Deaths: 16%. 
– Amputations: 23%. 
– Injured: 61%. 
In Cambodia it is realised that only a small number of the mine/Uxo victims receive rehabili-
tation assistance from national and international organisations.60 An estimate could therefore 
be that on the average only a half of the amputees receive the above prescribed treatment and 
that a half of the injured victims receive a more limited treatment amounting to 50% the full 
cost. It could, however, be assumed that over the years to come there will be an increase of 
2% annually in the number of people treated or the amount allocated for such treatment. 
The annual amounts will be discounted over the lifetime of the individual victims. The 
analysis will then proceed to calculate the medical costs related to a future loss of one victim 
annually over the analysis period, that is to say the next 20 years. With an analysis similar to 
the one above it will then be taken into account that future victims start with a more compre-
hensive treatment already at the outset.  
 
5.4 Economic gains from reducing the accident risk 
Table 5.2 is summing up the economic loss related to mine/Uxo victims, when it is assumed 
that a contaminated area is claiming one victim annually over the period under consideration, 
that is to say 20 years. 
   
Table 5.2: Total economic loss for typical victim and categories of mine/Uxo victims 
One victim every year over 20 years Disability % US$ % of victims US$ 
Death (fatal casualty) 100 % 259 510 16 % 42 156 
Productive loss 70 % 181 657 23 % 41 179 Amputation  
Medical costs  31 845  7 219 
Productive loss 40 % 103 804 61 % 63 411 Injured  
Medical costs  15 922  9 726 
 




– In connection with a fatal casualty the economic loss is total and there will be no 
medical costs. Deaths comprise on the average 16% of the total number of victims. 
– An amputation is considered a 70% disability; the production loss will therefore be 
70% compared to a fatal casualty. In addition there will be medical costs (as 
explained in chapter 5.3). On the average 23% of the victims have to undergo 
amputations. 
– Injured persons are considered to be disabled at 40%, and the productive loss will 
be accordingly. There will also be medical costs connected to the treatment of 
injuries, but amounting to only half the cost of treating amputees. Injured persons 
comprise 61% of the mine/Uxo victims on the average. 
 
                                                 
60 Cambodia Millennium Development Goals Report 2003 (November 2003) chapter 2.9.4.  
 39
A contaminated area expected to claim one victim per year actually and in the future will thus 
cause an accumulated human loss over a 20 years period amounting to about US$ 163,000 in 
economic terms. Future production losses and medical costs for different categories of victims 
have then been discounted into today’s present value. 
For the mine/Uxo exposed provinces of Cambodia in total it has been estimated that clearing 
of one km2 of mine/Uxo contaminated land could on the average reduce the accident rate with 
about 1.5 victims annually that is to say with 15 victims over a 10 years period. This rate has, 
however, been found to vary with province (table 5.1), an this will have to be taken into 
account when estimating the total economic gains from clearance of land there. 
 
Table 5.3: Reduced human loss in economic terms from clearance of 1 km2 of land, net 
present value over 20 years in 1000 US$. 
 Economic gains 
 1000 US$ 
Battambang 300 
Pursat 70 
Siem Reap 64 
Otdar Meanchey 241 
Banteay Meanchey 283 
Pailin 614 
Kampong Thom 365 
Kampong Cham 235 
Kampong Speu 566 
Kracheh 768 





The observations from table 5.1 on the variations of clearance efficiency rates among the 
provinces are in table 5.3 transferred into economic terms. The figures in table 5.3 can be 
compared directly with the clearance cost of 1 km2 contaminated land.  
It appears that clearance tasks in provinces like Pailin, Kracheh, Kampong Speu and to a 
lesser degree also Kampong Thom and Battambang, come closest to defend clearance costs 
on the account of reduced human loss. Provinces like Siem Reap and Pursat will have the 
largest difficulties with reaching up. 
In most cases additional benefits from using the cleared areas for productive purposes like 
agriculture, infrastructures etc may be required in order to fully meet the clearance costs (see 
chapter 6).  The reservations made above on the quality of data are, however, still valid, 
concerning in particular the need for revision of the estimates on priority suspected areas. 
Applied in analysis for future years, 2006 and onwards, the benefit estimates in Table 5.3 




6. Mine action for development 
6.1 Clearance for agricultural purposes 
The agricultural land cleared under the Cambodian mine action programme is specifically 
destined for distribution among the poorest parts of the population. It is therefore not expected 
that modern agricultural techniques and equipment will be used in the near future, which will 
also be reflected in the yields and in the amount of input etc. 
The staple food item in Cambodia is rice. The output from rice production will therefore be 
used as a guideline for the production value of agricultural areas. Small farmers use their 
areas also for fruit growing, vegetables etc, but output from such crops would usually not 
come in addition to, but rather replace some of the rice crop. 
Livestock production may on the other hand be a complementary trade, since animals to a 
large extent can be fed on waste produce from the agriculture. 
 
Paddy yield  
Tonnes per ha 




















US$/ha/year Pigs Poultry 
Battambang 1.6 3.0 1 % 1.4 97 111 0.4 4 
Pursat 2.3 2.4 3 % 2.1 87 142 0.9 31 
Siem Reap 1.3 2.5 7 % 1.2 97 95 0.7 5 
Otdar Meanchey 1.1  0 % 0.9 89 67 3.3 28 
Banteay Meanchey 1.4 2.5 0 % 1.2 98 97 0.4 3 
Pailin 1.8 2.0 19 % 1.9 89 136 4.4 40 
Kampong Thom 1.8 2.6 5 % 1.7 96 129 0.7 6 
Kampong Cham 2.4 3.2 37 % 3.1 102 253 1.5 11 
Kampong Speu 1.6 2.5 2 % 1.4 94 109 1.7 16 
Kratie 2.1 2.7 38 % 2.7 102 223 3.3 13 
Preah Vihear 1.5  0 % 1.3 83 86 1.7 18 
Average 1.7 3.2 15 % 1.9 94 142 1.2 10 
 
Table 6.1: Agricultural production in mine action provinces.62 
The information of paddy yield shows variations in output and practices over the provinces. 
Dry season yields, being dependent on the access to irrigation water, are significantly higher 
than the wet season yields. In many regions, however, the dry season crops are small, only a 
limited percentage of the area is replanted. These factors are combined in the calculation of 
the “net yield in tonnes per ha and year.” Here is also taken into account that an estimated 
13% of the crop is retained as seed for next year’s plantation or lost/wasted. 
The farm gate price for paddy also shows some regional variations and is relatively low in 
general. This information was collected in December 2003 for the Seila village database. 
In the absence of more accurate information it has been assumed that 20% of the value of the 
paddy production covers the cost of input factors. A large majority of the poor farmers will 
use animal draught power and little artificial fertilizers and pesticides. Some of the household 
members may have different options for work (in Thailand etc), while women, elderly people 
                                                 
61 Source for price information: Seila village database – December 2003. 
62 Source for agricultural produce and practices : FAO Annual report 2002. 
 41
and children may only be employed in farm work. Their labour input could therefore have a 
low alternative cost.  
On basis of this information can be calculated the paddy crop margin in US$ per ha per year. 
These annual net revenues from paddy cultivation are widely varying among the provinces. 
Information is available about the livestock population in different provinces. It is here 
assumed that the stock of pigs and poultry a particular year is roughly equivalent to the 
production output for sale or own consumption. The livestock population is further assumed 
related to the extent of the cultivated area in the province. Table 6.1 thus shows the number of 
pigs and poultry per ha cultivated land. 
It is assumed that pigs and poultry live off wastes from the farmland, the crops or from 
adjacent forest areas, so that there may be few input factors connected with raising them. 
Those who are not bred for consumption within the farmer’s household will be sold alive. 
Most of the labour input will also be performed by household members with few alternative 
occupations.  
According to the Poverty Reduction Strategy the agricultural sector in Cambodia is growing 
at a rate of 3.6% annually, but output experiences large year-to-year fluctuations, reflecting 
insufficient investment in the sector, over-exploitation of natural resources, and precarious 
weather conditions.63 A long-term annual productivity increase of 2% has thus been found 
appropriate and is built into this analysis. 
The value of agricultural production has been considered over 20 years, discounted to present 
value at a rate of 10%. The market value of the land at the end of the period has been 
estimated to 5 times the value of the produce for the last year.  
The fear that it might be mined is in many places in Cambodia an important reason for not 
taking agricultural land into use, and in some instances this fear might be based on lack of 
information. When de-mining is taking place in a region it will presumably be possible also to 
open up land adjacent to the actual minefields, by applying various techniques for reducing 
the suspected area at considerably less cost than full clearance, marking and sealing off mined 
areas from non-contaminated land etc.  
Only site specific information can decide whether this is the case and to what extent. Here the 
extra benefit in this respect is estimated preliminarily to an additional 30% of land which can 
be settled, planted and harvested etc.  
                                                 
63 Council for Social Development (2002): National Poverty Reduction Strategy 2003-2005, chapter 4.1.1. 
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 Farm revenues per square km land, 1000 US$ 
 Annual Net present value over 20 years 
  Cleared land + 30% land 
Battambang 14 152 197 
Pursat 25 266 346 
Siem Reap 14 151 196 
Otdar Meanchey 28 305 397 
Banteay Meanchey 12 133 173 
Pailin 44 470 612 
Kampong Thom 18 191 248 
Kampong Cham 35 375 487 
Kampong Speu 23 243 316 
Kracheh 41 444 577 
Preah Vihear 21 224 291 
Average 22 240 311 
 
Table 6.2: Revenues from 1 km2 of agricultural land, US$ per year and net present value over 
20 years, with an additional 30% of land made available. 
 
In Table 6.2 the net revenues from paddy farming and from rising livestock are combined and 
related to the cultivation of 1 km2 of land. Revenues are found to be highest in Pailin and 
Kracheh, more than 3 times higher than in Banteay Meanchey, Siem Reap and Battambang.  
Agricultural areas in Pailin, Kracheh and Kampong Cham will provide the largest 
contribution towards covering their clearance costs. Areas in Banteay Meanchey, Siem Reap 
and Battambang will have much more difficulties with justifying clearance demands when 
counting agricultural benefits only. 
The revenues from agricultural production will apparently on their own account have 
difficulties with justifying the cost of mine/Uxo clearance in many areas; this conclusion 
seems valid for the majority of the provinces in Cambodia. The explanation lies in the 
generally low yields of rice and in rather low farm-gate prices for the produce. From table 6.1 
it is clear that access to irrigation water in the dry season could improve the situation very 
much. Production in the dry season could also presumably be sold at a higher price than can 
be obtained at the end of the wet season (December). 
There is a challenge towards gathering more socio-economic data on the total benefits to the 
local community from clearance of land. The question could for example be how much more 
land can be distributed for resettlement and agricultural use as a direct consequence of 
clearance of some specific land. In some instances more land than that which was cleared 
could be taken into use, and such cases would be important to have knowledge of at the 
planning stage.  
In the socio-economic reports there is already provision for registration of indirect 
beneficiaries from the land cleared, in addition to those beneficiaries directly taking into use 
formerly contaminated areas. As of the Work Plan for 2004 the direct beneficiaries are 
counted to 11,000 families and the indirect to 71,000 families.64 
                                                 
64 CMAA: Mine Clearance Analysis and Guidance 2004, chapter 2.2.2. 
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Cost benefit analysis for future years should update the revenue estimates in Table 6.2 with 
the development in the price of paddy and livestock.  
   
6.2 Irrigation canals 
Mine clearance related to irrigation canals and systems aims at reopening the possibility for 
irrigation of agricultural areas. Clearance of the canal area will therefore presumably benefit a 
much wider extent of agricultural land. In specific cost benefit analyses this relation will vary 
from case to case, and little information is currently available for concocting a general case.  
A possible assumption could therefore be that 1 km of irrigation canals will allow dry-season 
irrigation and planting of 1 km2 agricultural land. The canal will presumably have to be 
cleared in a 20 m wide sector on each side (40 m in total), so that a 1 km long canal will 
constitute a clearance task of  4 ha or 0.04 km2. 
Access to irrigation water provides opportunities for dry-season crops. The irrigated land 
generally produces higher yields than wet season plantations (Table 6.1), with some variations 
as of province. The benefits from clearing a 1 km long canal will accordingly comprise the 
extra net revenues to the farmers from dry season crops on 1 km2 of land. There will 
presumably be no effect on livestock production while the other elements in the analysis of 
agricultural production (chapter 6.1) remain unchanged.  
Some provinces in Cambodia appear to offer few possibilities for dry season replanting as of 
the statistics. They will not be included here, but specific cost benefit analyses should look 
into such opportunities from case to case. 
 
 Farm revenues per sq km land, 1000 US$ 
 Annual Net present value over 20 years 
Battambang 20 219 
Pursat 15 158 
Siem Reap 17 180 
Otdar Meanchey 0 0 
Banteay Meanchey 17 182 
Pailin 12 133 
Kampong Thom 17 186 
Kampong Cham 23 244 
Kampong Speu 17 177 
Kratie 19 204 
Preah Vihear 0 0 
Average 21 223 
 
Table 6.3: Dry season crop revenues from 1 km2 irrigated agricultural land, US$ per year and 
net present value over 20 years. 
 
Table 6.3 shows the net extra benefits to farmers from access to irrigation water in the dry 
season. There are some regional variations.65 
                                                 
65 The revenues in table 6.3 are lower in many cases than those in table 6.1, among others since no extra incomes 
from livestock are presumed. 
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The main point is, however, that the extra net revenues per km2 of irrigated land in table 6.3 
are benefits resulting from the clearance of a much smaller area, an irrigation canal of 1 km 
length, which could constitute a clearance task of not more than 0.04 km2.  
Assuming for example a clearance cost level of US$ 0.9 per m2, or US$ 900,000 per km2, the 
clearance of a 1 km irrigation canal would cost about US$ 36,000 which is the figure to be 
compared with the “net present value over 20 years” in table 6.3. 
As this comparison shows, in all cases and provinces the benefits from clearance of irrigation 
canals have no problems with justifying the clearance costs. Such tasks should in fact be 
undertaken even if the clearance costs for some reason were substantially higher or the 
irrigation canal needed considerably longer than the 1 km considered here. 
 
6.3 Loss of livestock 
The number of livestock killed or injured in mine/ Uxo accidents is given in table 6.4 as of 
CMVIS statistics. On the average a loss of about 50 animals is reported annually over the 
period 2001 to 2003. The number seems to have decreased substantially, which could be a 
benefit from clearance. There is, however, a report of 40 cows from the Battambang province 
in 2001 which stands out as rather exceptional. 
If these figures tell the whole story the losses of livestock do not amount to much in economic 
terms. Even if the value of an animal is estimated as high as US$ 500, the loss will comprise 
less than US$ 85 per km2 priority area per year on the average. 
 
 2001 2002 2003 Average 
Cows 76 38 12 42 
Buffalos 1 6 1 3 
Horses 1 1 1 1 
Other animals 4 3 7 5 
Total 82 48 21 50 
Source: CMVIS: National Census 2001-03. 
 
Table 6.4: Livestock killed or injured at mine/Uxo incidents. 
 
Most likely there is an underreporting of animals killed or injured in mine accidents in 
Cambodia. In the best case the figures in Table 6.4 seem to comprise only incidents where 
also humans were injured or killed. Moreover the figures in Table 6.4 are contradicted by 
other observations that 14% of the villagers in Cambodia had lost at least one animal to 
landmines.66  
These are indications that landmine damage to domestic animals might constitute a more 
significant economic loss; in Afghanistan very high losses were indeed reported. This could 
call for an improved reporting system of damage to domestic animals by landmines. The most 
practical approach could be to improve the CMVIS reporting system so that animals killed 
and injures to animals are recorded regularly as part of the monthly census, also including 
incidents with no damage to human beings. 
                                                 
66 Level One Survey, referred in CMAC: Annual Report 2003, page 2. 
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6.4 Transport systems 
“Improved roads” is often quoted as first priority when villagers in Cambodia express their 
preferences for infrastructure. Transport facilities often constitute a key factor, leading to 
increased agricultural production, more land under cultivation and intensified land use, as 
farmers take advantage of expanded market opportunities. 
Rural infrastructure is inadequate in Cambodia, with extremely poor transport links. The rural 
road network is often in disrepair rendering roads impassable, especially during the wet 
season. In addition, many of these rural roads pass through minefields or areas littered with 
Uxo. The mine action programme cleared 313 km of roads in 2003, while 29 km are planned 
cleared in 2004 according to the National Work Plan (without RCAF which has been 
extensively engaged in road clearance).  
Clearance of roads will benefit persons and vehicles using the road in the form of more 
convenient transport opportunities, reduced travel time and travel costs. Mine-contaminated 
road links may generally hinder road users from travelling the shortest route to their 
destinations. In this analysis it is presumed that a kilometre of mined roads will cause 
diversion of traffic onto other links of double distance on the average. The benefits from 
clearance of 1 km of mined roads will thus consist of the savings to road traffic and transport 
from travelling a 1 km shorter route. 
This assumption has been made in order to concoct a general case. Specific cost benefit 
analyses should reflect the local conditions and take into account actual travel distances at 
alternative routes. The salient issue will be the difference between the travel distances on the 
reopened road compared to the alternatives the traffic had to use before clearance.  
 
 Ox-cart Bicycle Motorbike Motor-
trailer 
Car/pickup Truck 
Daily traffic (annual average)67 19 13 297 26 19 5 
Generated traffic 40% 8 5 119 10 8 2 
Speed km/hour 2 5 15 10 15 15 
Passengers per trip 2 1 3 5 10 10 
Reduced travel distance, km 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Reduced travel time hours per year 6650 910 20790 4550 4433 1167 
Value travel time US$/day 0,23 0,23 0,23 0,23 0,23 0,23 
Value of reduced travel time in US$/year 191 26 598 131 127 34 
Vehicle operating cost US$/km 0.001 0.001 0.07 0.1 0.1 0.36 
Vehicle operating cost US$/year 7 5 7277 910 665 630 
Reduced time cost generated traffic 
US$/year 
38 5 120 26 25 7 
Reduced VOC generated traffic US$/year 1 1 1455 182 133 126 
Total gains US$/year 237 37 9449 1249 951 796 
 
Table 6.5: Transport and traffic analysis. 
 
Information about annual average daily traffic has been obtained from counts undertaken by 
the Tertiary Roads Improvement Programme (TRIP) on rural roads. The clearance is thus 
presumably concerned with rural or tertiary roads. Here a large part of the traffic consists of 
motorbikes.  
                                                 
67 Source: The Tertiary Road Improvement Programme (TRIP)  
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Information about passenger numbers, vehicle operating costs (VOC) for categories of 
vehicles and the value of travel time has to some extent been obtained from the ILO Upstream 
Project. Data have however, been modified somewhat for use in this analysis. It is assumed 
that reducing the travel distance to the half will increase traffic by 40%.  
The shorter travel distance will reduce time on the road for the persons travelling. These gains 
can be evaluated by an assumption of people’s willingness to pay for time savings. Shorter 
distance to destination will also generate savings related to vehicle operations, for each 
category according to their specific unit costs. Benefits for generated traffic have, according 
to standard cost benefit techniques, been evaluated relative to the consumer surplus. 
The savings for motorbike traffic and in particular their VOC, will as expected form the most 
important benefit component related to improvement of the rural roads network. Other groups 
of road users contribute much less. In total, however, the amount is considerable, about US$ 
13,000 on an annual basis. 
 Annual Net present value over 20 years 
Benefits from clearance of 1 km of rural road, 1000 US$ 13 108 
  
Table 6.6: Mine clearance of rural roads, annual and net present values in 1000 US$. 
 
The annual benefits have then been discounted over a 20 years’ future period into a net 
present value. This value can be compared to the clearance costs of 1 km of rural roads. 
The Asian Development Bank (ADB) requires de-mining of rural road alignments to a width 
of 20 metres on each side of the road centreline.68  Taking this requirement into account a 1 
km road link will constitute a clearance task of 4 ha or 0.04 km2.  
Assuming for example a clearance cost level of US$ 0.9 per m2, or US$ 900,000 per km2, the 
clearance of a 1 km road link would cost about US$ 36,000 which can be compared to the net 
present value over 20 years in table 6.6 of US$ 108,000. 
Still the state of repair of the road ought to be taken into account. Clearance tasks regularly 
form integral parts of rural roads rehabilitation programmes. Rehabilitation of rural roads may 
cost at least US$ 6,000 per km (upgrading).69 The actual need must be assessed from case to 
case. 
Clearance tasks on rural roads thus appear to be well capable of defending their cost. In case 
the cleared road should replace alternative links which are only 50% (or ½ km) longer, the 
benefits will be reduced to the half or about US$ 54,000. Still this would exceed normal road 
clearance costs by a clear margin. 
 
6.5 Schools 
School attendance is low in Cambodia, and where schools exist, class sizes are frequently 
large, 50 children per class or more. Often two or three shifts a day are needed due to the 
limited number of classrooms. Schools are frequently dilapidated, old buildings or very 
simple wooden framed, open-sided structures with thatch or corrugated iron roofs. In some 
places, classes are held in private houses in the absence of other facilities. 
                                                 
68 Asian Development Bank (2001): The North-western Rural Development Project, page 16. 
69 NCG (2004): Rural Infrastructure Development in Cambodia, page 53. 
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A total of 61 schools were cleared under the mine action programme in 2003 (by the civilian 
agencies), constituting an estimated 4% of the cleared area, while 41 schools have been 
identified for clearance in the Work Plan for 2004. 
It could be assumed that a school constitutes of 2 shifts of classes with 40 pupils in each so 
that 80 pupils70 attend the school every day, 6 days a week for 40 weeks a year. The village 
school premises have been mined, however, so instead of attending the nearest and most 
convenient location, the pupils have to travel and crowd in on schools in other villages. The 
extra travel distance could be 5 km each way on the average for each of them. An assumption 
can also be made that 80% the pupils are travelling by bicycle with 2 on each and 20% as 
passengers on motorbikes, with 2 pupils each bike. 
The socio-economic cost of this extra transport will then comprise the operational costs of 
bikes and motorbikes for all the 2 x 5 km return trips needed every day of the school-year plus 
the extra time costs of the pupils and the motorbike drivers. 
 
Pupils per class 40  
Number of shifts a day 2  
Days a week 6  
School weeks a year 40  
Extra distance to school km 5  
Trips to and from a day 2  
 Bicycle Motorbike 
Mode of travelling 80 % 20 % 
Pupils per mode of transport 2 2 
Driver  1 
Number of transports a day 32 8 
Travel speed km/hour 5 15 
Value of travel time US$/day 0.15 0.23 
Vehicle operating cost US$/km 0.001 0.07 
Time cost annually US$ 576 85 
Travel cost annually US$ 77 1344 
 
Table 6.7: School attendance and cost of transport to school. 
 
Table 6.7 gives the input information used in the analysis. For the vehicle operating cost the 
assumptions correspond to those applied in chapter 6.5 on road transport. Value of travel time 
has been reduced to US$ 0.15 a day for the children, retaining US$ 0.23 for the motorbike 
drivers. The time loss and costs will be highest for bicycle transport (also with a 50%-50% 
share), while the higher vehicle operation costs make motorbike a far more expensive mode. 
 
 Annual Net present value over  20 years 
Benefits from clearance of school premises, 1000 US$ 2.1 18 
 
Table 6.8: Benefits from clearance of schools, 1000 US$ annually and net present value over 
20 years. 
                                                 
70 The 41 schools planned for clearance in the NWP for 2004 comprise 7082 pupils or over 170 pupils per school 
(NWP chapter 2.2.3). 
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As table 6.8 shows the total net benefits from clearance of school areas, resulting in reduced 
need for travelling to schools in distant villages, amount to about US$ 2,100 annually or  US$ 
18,000 as net present value over a 20 years’ period. The last figure can be compared with the 
clearance cost of school areas.  
Based on information from previous clearance tasks, a school area can be estimated to about 
1.2 ha on the average. A clearance cost of US$ 0.9 per m2 would thus amount to US$ 10,800 
for a school area of 1.2 ha, which is well below the estimated benefits of US$ 18,000. Such 
tasks could be justified even in cases when the areas to be cleared were considerably larger, or 
the children were able to find alternative school facilities within closer range. For schools 
with larger numbers of pupils than the 80 considered, the benefits would increase 
proportionally. 
 
6.6 Wells and water supply 
Lack of clean domestic water is a major problem for many rural people in Cambodia, 
especially in the dry season. Most rely on shallow dug wells or nearby rivers for household 
water and many have to travel long distances to the closest source of supply. The costs 
connected to the provision of water supply comprise more than the eventual drilling and 
construction of the well. Usually there will be a considerable amount of planning and field 
research connected in order to provide stable and safe supplies with enough water also in the 
dry season, together with institutional components to secure sustainability. Donor 
programmes in this field tend to be costly. 
Wells are thus not easily replaced, and when a well has been mined the alternative supply 
may be located far away, be contaminated or prove insufficient for the demand, so that the 
users will have to line up and wait, sometimes for hours. In times of shortage one member 
may have to be constantly occupied with the provision of water for the family. This task will 
often fall on one of the children, being then prevented from attending school. 
A total of 130 wells were de-mined in 2003, and estimated to comprise an area of 0.2 ha each 
on the average such tasks constituted 1.3% of the total area cleared (by the civilian operators). 
For the 2004 Work Plan 14 tasks have been identified. 
We can safely assume that a well considered for clearance will be a much needed well, 
serving a community of perhaps as many as 15 families. When this near by source of water 
supply has been blocked, one family member, that is to say 15 persons from the community, 
may have to travel as much as 5 km, 70% of them using bicycle and 30% motorbike for the 
transport. At the source this person may have to wait 1 hour on the average in order to fill up 
the container for transport back. It is assumed here that water is fetched by an adult person. 




Persons engaged 15  
Number of trips a day 1  
Days a week 7  
Weeks a year 26  
Distance to source km 5  
Trips to and from 2  
Waiting at source, hours 1  
 Bicycle Motorbike 
Mode of travelling 70 % 30 % 
Travel speed km/hour 5 15 
Duration one trip, hours 3 1,7 
Value of travel time US$/day 0,23 0,23 
Vehicle operating cost US$/km 0,001 0,07 
Time cost annually US$ 165 39 
Travel cost annually US$ 19 573 
 
 Table 6.9: Water supply and cost of water transport.  
 
Table 6.9 provides the input data for the analysis of benefits related to reopened access to a 
water supply source in the vicinity. The benefits are calculated as the reduced amount of 
transport cost and travel time needed in comparison with the collection of water from more 
distant sources.  
 
 Annual Net present value over  20 years 
Benefits from clearance of wells, 1000 US$ 0.8 6.8 
 
Table 6.10: Benefits from clearance of wells, 1000 US$ annually and net present value over 
20 years. 
 
As Table 6.10 shows the benefits from clearing a well, estimated by the method described 
above, could amount to US$ 800 annually. Discounted over a 20 years’ period the total 
benefits would thus constitute US$ 6,800, which is the figure to be compared with the 
clearance cost of wells.  
Clearance of a well that on the average comprises a task of 0.2 ha, will cost about US$ 1,800 
a piece, assuming unit costs of 0.9 US$ per m2 or US$ 9,000 per ha. 
It can therefore be concluded that the benefits from such clearance tasks are well capable of 
defending their costs, even in cases when the suspected areas are significantly larger. When 
the number of families using this source of water supply is higher than the 15 presumed here, 
the benefits will increase proportionally.    
 
6.7 Historical and cultural sites 
Cambodia’s tourist sector is playing a crucial role and is considered a key to the country's 
development. Over the last decade it has made significant contributions to economic growth 
by attracting foreign investments, creating jobs, and generating income for the local people. 
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With Cambodia’s enormous cultural and natural heritage, the policy will be geared towards 
cultural and eco-tourism.  
There are many historical sites in Cambodia. The Angkor temple complex is a world's 
heritage site. Besides that actions are taken to develop other cultural and eco-tourist 
destinations such as the Kulen Mountain, Kos Ker temple, Preah Vihea temple, Ta Mok house 
in Anlong Veng, and Sambo Prey in the central zone. Preservation of the historical sites is a 
socio-cultural obligation, which can also generate revenues in foreign exchange, and the 
Cambodian government intends to use tourism as a strategy in its overall goal to relieve 
poverty.71  
An important task of mine clearance was carried out in the south of the province of Siem 
Reap from 1992 on, to give access to the main historical and religious site in the Kingdom of 
Cambodia, the Angkor area. From 1993-2003 the clearance tasks related to temple areas there 
amounted to 1.1 km2 in total.72 The temple areas of Angkor comprise in total about 250 km2. 
Total receipts from tourist related activities were estimated to US$ 454 million in 2002, with 
an increase of 19.5% from the year before. In 2002 tourist receipts accounted for 11.4% of 
GDP. Average tourist expenditures in Cambodia were US$ 577 per person in 2002.73  
The total number of foreign tourists to Angkor will in 2004 exceed 420,000.74 Assuming that 
the above mentioned figure of US$ 577 reflects the gross spending per tourist rather than the 
contribution to the GNP, a more conservative estimate of US$ 200 per tourist per year will be 
applied, to account for the deduction of inputs from other sectors to the tourist industry.  
This would nevertheless result in an annual income generation of US$ 320,000 from each of 
the 250 km2 of temple areas in Angkor, on the assumption of 400,000 tourists per year. This 
amount is spent inside the country, but not necessarily entirely within the localities harbouring 
the temples. It is, however, assumed that the historic sites with the ancient temples constitute 
the main attraction for tourists into Cambodia. 
 
Tourists at Angkor annually, 1000 400 
Tourist contribution to GNP, US$ per visitor 200 
Angkor temple areas km2. 250 
Annual revenues per km2 temple area in Angkor, US$ 1000 320 
Income generation compared with Angkor 50 % 
Incomes per sq km from opening up other temple areas, US$ 1000 160 
Additional attraction of tourists, annual number per km2 of temple area. 800 
 
Table 6.11: Tourists and tourist revenues from temple areas  
 
On the other hand it can not be expected that the opening up of new areas will generate 
incomes to that extent. From a cautious optimism some 50% of that amount could perhaps be 
foreseen, which would still constitute an income of about US$ 160,000 annually from each 
new km2 of temple area opened up. A total of 800 additional tourists would then be attracted 
annually per km2 of temple area with renewed access. 
                                                 
71 Council for Social Development (2002): National Poverty Reduction Strategy 2003-2005, chapter 4.2.3. 
72 Source: CMAC Demining Unit 6. 
73 National Institute of Statistics: Statistical Yearbook 2003, page 293. 
74 Source: Ministry of Tourism. January – October 2004: 418,000 foreign and 290,000 Cambodian tourists. 
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 Annually Net present value over  20 years 
Benefits from opening up 1 km2 of temple area, 1000 US$ 160 1362 
 
Table 6.12: Benefits from clearance of temple areas, 1000 US$ 
 
The annual contribution to the GNP of US$ 160,000 can be discounted over 20 years resulting 
in a total net present value to the economy of US$ 1.36 million from opening up 1 km2 of 
temple area for tourism. This figure can then be compared with the cost of clearance. 
At a rate of US$ 0.9 per m2 or US$ 900,000 per km2 the clearance costs would end up well 
below the estimated future benefits of US$ 1.36 million, and clearance tasks in temple areas 
could come out with a considerable surplus.  
Presumably there might not even be need for de-mining the entire temple premises. In the 
Angkor temple area of 250 km2 about 1.1 km2 of clearance tasks were identified (there is still 
much Uxo remaining). The clearance task could thus perhaps be reduced to 75% or maybe 
even 50% of the actual temple area opened up for visitors. 
For a particular clearance task the assumptions applied here must be checked and adapted to 
local circumstances. Still it appears that the benefits from the tourist industry alone could very 
well be capable of defending the costs of clearance tasks related to temples. 
 
6.8 Health stations 
Access to health stations may be difficult in rural Cambodia, in the remote areas there are few 
available and people travel considerable distances. When some premises are mined, people 
from neighbouring villages may have difficulties with finding alternatives close by. It is thus 
assumed here that they may have to travel on the average 5 km longer to reach to the nearest 
location.  
The travellers will consist of sick people needing transport, but also of people accompanying 
them, mothers with children for example. It is here assumed that a station closed because of 
mine contamination will generate need for extra travel for 15 persons a day, during 5 days a 
week, 50 weeks a year. The travel will be to and fro, that is to say 10 km in all. It is also 
assumed that 70% need motorized transport (motorbike), while the rest is using bicycle.  
Benefits from clearance so that a health station can reopen include reduced travel costs and a 
valuation of the reduced travel time (see tables 6.7 and 6.9). 
 
 Annually Net present value over 20 years 
Benefits from clearance of health stations, US$ 1000 2.0 16.7 
 
Table 6.13: Benefits from clearance of health stations, 1000 US$ annually and net present 
value over 20 years. 
 
Table 6.13 gives the annual benefits from clearance of health stations, and the net present 
value discounted over 20 years. This last figure can be compared to the actual cost of clearing 
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the contaminated area comprising the health station. Assuming that a health station on the 
average occupies an area of 1.2 ha and a clearance cost of US$ 9,000 per ha, it appears that 
clearance of health stations is well capable of defending its costs. 
 
6.9 Other social and cultural infrastructure 
Regarding administrative offices, pagodas etc, the relevant items on the benefit side will 
comprise the construction costs including the value of the terrain. Here the state of repair of 
the building on site must also be taken into account; there will perhaps be need for 
rehabilitation, which should be reflected in the value estimate. This value can then be 
compared directly with the cost of clearance. 
 







7. Clearance techniques and costs 
7.1 Approaches and techniques in use 
The agencies currently involved in the mine action programme in Cambodia actually 
comprise the Cambodian Mine Action Centre (CMAC), the HALO Trust, the Mines Advisory 
Group (MAG), constituting the 3 civilian operators, and the Royal Cambodian Armed Forces. 
There is little standardization among the operators as of the approach to the tasks, the set-up 
of teams for the field work, techniques and types of equipment in use. This makes it difficult 
to compare efficiency and costs.  
On the other hand, there might also be advantages to some degrees with letting the operators 
pursue their own approach and experiment with the best way of meeting technical and 
economic challenges. Competition among the operators is, however, limited, as there is no 
regular practice of putting larger clearance tasks out on tender. Each operator to a large extent 
benefits from its proper and regular sources for funding (see chapter 4.5). 
 
Manual de-mining is the basic technique applied by all operators, this is also a slow technique 
and therefore costly. It can, however, be applied widely on almost all types of terrain.  
Mine Detection Dogs (MDD) have been introduced by CMAC, at the outset with technical 
support from Sweden. The use of MDD is in particular appropriate in areas with high contents 
of fragmented metal, on hard ground, and in quality control. Dogs can also be used for 
technical survey and area reduction. CMAC actually disposes of 5 MDD teams which cleared 
an area of about 1.3 km2 in 2003.75 
In Cambodia the mechanical de-mining techniques consist of various types of machinery used 
to prepare the ground for manual or dog teams, largely through cutting the vegetation before 
de-mining. Operators claim large efficiency gains from using these brush-cutters on suitable 
terrain. 
Operators have developed different approaches of involving local communities in mine-
marking, Uxo disposal and mine risk education and reduction activities. The approach is vital 
especially as a way to cope with the growing Uxo accidents problem in the country. 
One factor influencing clearance productivity to a high degree is the different practices among 
operators towards applying area reduction techniques before clearance operations start. This is 
a field where new approaches are being introduced to give more value for money, in the form 
of clearance of areas which really were infested. On the paper, however, it might in some 
cases reduce productivity, measured as costs per m2 cleared for example. 
Survey activities constitute an important task in mine action, both for marking and fencing off 
areas to avoid accidents, to reduce areas to be cleared and thereby the costs, but also to gather 
information about the type of area, soil type, content of metal etc. which can help determine 
the cost of clearance and the use and benefits from the area after clearance. 
7.2 Clearance costs 
Information about the costs of mine and Uxo clearance in Cambodia is of widely varying 
quality. Even the information about financing is lacking, since the amounts RCAF receives 
are largely unknown. Some operators receive considerable donations in kind, of equipment 
and technical assistance. These donations do not regularly appear as costs in the accounts. 
                                                 
75 CMAC Annual Report 2003, page 30. 
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For the year 2003 CMAC presents an average cost of US$ 0.95 per m2 cleared, underlining 
that this cost also includes a number of non-clearance activities.76 RCAF consistently applies 
a rate of US$ 0.35 per m2 in its calculations of de-mining costs.77 
Based on its total project income and clearance rates HALO calculates its cost to US$ 0.68 
per m2 land cleared in 2004. This constitutes a 10% improvement from the year before.78 
In Cambodia village de-mining continues, although technically it is illegal. In some cases, 
people hire a village de-miner to clear the land for them. Landmine Monitor 2003 reported 
that in Banteay Meanchey the price for clearing one hectare was US$ 90 while in 
Battambang, the price rose from US$ 100 to 250 per ha in 2002 (US$ 0.025 per m2).79 
A recent study (Griffin and Keeley 2004) based on model calculations for Cambodia, has 
found costs per m2 ranging from US$ 1.50 when only manual de-mining is used, to US$ 0.96 
with the current mix of machines, dogs and manual de-mining teams. Using dogs to a larger 
extent could, in combination with other cost reduction measures reduce costs further to US$ 
0.65 - 0.62 per m2 land cleared.80 
Analysis of cost estimates presented by operators to their clients reveals unit rates of about 
US$ 0.85 per m2 after adding depreciation and 10% overhead costs. 
A complete picture of the cost of clearance should comprise: 
– Only those activities connected to the clearance of mines and Uxo (still training, 
survey, planning etc related to clearance should be regarded as integral parts). 
– Free of charge inputs, grants of equipment, technical assistance, manpower, housing 
etc from donors or the government should be costed in a regular way.  
– Input and use of all types of capital goods like equipment and machinery, should be 
costed on basis of regular annual depreciation rates. 
– Appropriate maintenance costs on a sustainable basis must be included for all 
equipment. 
– Overhead costs must be included also when they are financed separately. 
– Techniques and methods in use must conform to international security standards.  
 
The operators should be required to provide CMAA with better data on the cost of conducting 
different mine action activities. One way of relating costs to the types of area cleared and the 
different approaches and techniques used, could be to go via registration of the time used in 
hours for each individual clearance task (some operators already collect such data). Cost per 
hour for different types of teams and tasks will presumably be a much more stable and less 
controversial entity than the costs per m2 cleared. This cost per hour can then through a 
second step be calculated into cost per m2 after an analysis of what time it takes on the 
average to clear a certain type of area with a given technique. These figures may be expected 
to vary, being depending on a number of factors. 
                                                 
76 CMAC Annual Report 2003, Executive Summary page v. 
77 Engineer Forces Command HQ Report: The result of mine and unexploded ordnance clearance 2004.   
78 The HALO Trust Cambodia: Annual Report 2004, page 6. 
79 Paterson and Vanna (2004): A Study of Capacity Development in Mine Action, Case Study of Cambodia 
(GICHD September 2004) page 34.  
80 Griffin and Keeley (December 2004): Joint Evaluation of Mine Action in Cambodia, Annex 2.2. 
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Some operators are in the process of developing their accounting procedures, which could 
result in better cost-estimates with more details on different types of areas, tasks and 
techniques which are largely non-existent now. 
For the further analysis it will be assumed that the existing cost level for the clearance 
activities conducted under the mine action programme in Cambodia could be situated in the 
vicinity of US$ 0.90 per m2, while there might be possibilities of efficiency gains resulting in 
a reduction towards about US$ 0.70 through use of dogs to a larger extent etc. A factor 
leading in the opposite direction, however, is that clearance may in the future more and more 
have to be conducted in the remote and difficult accessible regions of the country.   
 
7.3 De-mining accidents 
The number of de-mining accidents reported is actually at a level of about 10 a year. In 2003 
CMAC reported incidents involving 7 de-miners, of which 2 were seriously wounded, the 
others slightly injured.81 HALO reports of three accidents in 2004, two of them in minefields 
inflicting minor wounds on one person. The third one involved a de-mining supervisor who in 
disregard of direct instructions attempted to cut open an anti-tank mine. This led to his 
death.82 CMVIS reports of 8 accidents during de-mining in 2003 and 4 in 2002. For earlier 
years de-mining is not a category in the CMVIS statistics.83 On the other hand the CMVIS 
figures may include accidents both with the official operators and unofficial private clearance. 
There is a question, however, to what extent accidents may go unreported. An initiative could 
be taken to establish a record also for the previous years, of accidents linked directly to de-
mining and Uxo clearance with the certified de-mining operators.  
                                                 
81 CMAC Annual Report 2003, page 71. 
82 HALO Trust Annual Report 2004, page 5. 
83 CMVIS National Census 2002-2003, page 21. 
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8. Evaluation of priorities 
8.1 Assumptions and approach 
The achievements of the Cambodian mine action programme will in this and the next chapters 
(8-9) be evaluated by applying standard cost benefit methodology. The effect on the two 
principal objectives of mine action, reducing the human loss and clearance for development 
will be measured in economic terms, with further conclusions on how and where the mine 
action programme can contribute to fulfil these goals in the most efficient way. The 
assessment of the human loss conducted in chapter 5 and the different types and tasks of 
min/Uxo clearance for development activities evaluated in chapters 6, together with the 
observations on current clearance costs in chapter 7, provide the main input to this analysis. 
The analysis makes extensive use of the benefit cost ratio (BCR)84 for the comparison of 
different clearance activities and tasks (on methodology see chapter 1.3). A positive BCR 
means that the benefits cover the costs, the break even point is 0, and with a negative BCR the 
economic benefits as calculated here do not suffice to justify the clearance costs. This needs 
not imply, however, that other than economic benefits are irrelevant; frequently there will be 
additional considerations to take into account.  
Still, in many cases those other benefits may have a direct relation to the economic benefits as 
calculated here; to the number of mine/Uxo victims expected avoided in future years, and to 
the size and types of area that can be reclaimed for useful purposes. In such cases the actual 
priority indicated may still be relevant, even though the BCR might experience an upgrading 
in magnitude through the inclusion of other benefits, so that more clearance activities and 
tasks come out on the positive side. This could call for more resources to mine action, but 
nevertheless by withholding the main rank of priority.    
The benefit side of the ratio will thus regularly comprise the two main components:  
(1) Development effects; including production or revenue increase, improved access to 
infrastructure etc. 
(2) Expected reduction of human loss.  
 
The cost side has been assessed in two alternatives, a cost of US$ 0.90 or US$ 0.70 per m2 of 
land cleared, as explained in chapter 7 (amounting to US$ 9,000 or 7,000 per ha). 
 
8.2 Agricultural land 
The evaluation of clearance tasks on agricultural land come out with rather low benefits 
compared to the costs. The agricultural output is generally moderate in Cambodia, even 
though an annual 2% increase in output has been included in the analysis, and it is presumed 
that the clearance of an area on the average can open up 30% more of formerly suspected land 
for productive use (see chapter 6.1). 
 
                                                 




Production Human loss Benefit Cost Ratio 
 
 
Provinces Per cent of benefits US$ 0.90 US$ 0.70 
Battambang 40 % 60 % -0.45 -0.29 
Pursat 83 % 17 % -0.54 -0.41 
Siem Reap 75 % 25 % -0.71 -0.63 
Otdar Meanchey 62 % 38 % -0.29 -0.09 
Banteay Meanchey 38 % 62 % -0.49 -0.35 
Pailin 50 % 50 % 0.36 0.75 
Kampong Thom 40 % 60 % -0.32 -0.12 
Kampong Cham 67 % 33 % -0.20 0.03 
Preah Vihear 52 % 48 % -0.38 -0.20 
Average/others 53 % 47 % -0.38 -0.20 
 
Table 8.1: Clearance of agricultural land – cost benefit analysis. 
 
At the actual clearance cost of US$ 0.90 per m2 only agricultural areas in Pailin come out on 
the positive side, benefits here surpass costs by 36%. In case the clearance costs could be 
lowered to US$ 0.70 per m2, Kampong Cham would also join the positive side, while some 
other provinces are approaching break even.  
Yet the main conclusion is not that clearance of agricultural areas is unprofitable. There is, 
however, a call for conscious prioritization, a planning process capable of identifying those 
areas and tasks that are of highest importance to the local communities, for agricultural 
production and also towards reducing prevailing high risks of mine/Uxo accidents. This 
seems to concern provinces like Siem Reap and Pursat in particular. 
Cost efficient methods in clearance and improved area reduction techniques are also highly 
important issues. This will be imperative for the conception of strategies concerning all types 
of suspected areas, providing that Cambodia is aiming at fulfilment of its obligations towards 
the Ottawa Convention, and in view of a possible shift of interest in the donor community 
away from financing mine action. 
The distribution of benefits between production gains and reduced human loss, reflect the 
observed differences in output among the individual provinces regarding agricultural 
production (chapter 6.1), and the efficiency of area clearance as a means towards reducing 
accident risks and number of casualties (chapter 5).  
 
8.3 Irrigation systems 
For irrigation canals it has been presumed that clearance of the canal area will benefit a much 
wider extent of agricultural land. One km of irrigation canals could thus allow dry-season 
irrigation of 1 km2 agricultural land, while 1 km of canal may constitute a clearance task of 
only 4 ha. The benefits to the farmers materialise from the possibility of dry season crops on 
the land (see chapter 6.2). From the statistics it appears that some provinces in Cambodia 






Production Human loss Benefit Cost Ratio 
 
 
Provinces Per cent of benefits US$ 0.90 US$ 0.70 
Battambang 95 % 5 % 5.4 7.3 
Pursat 98 % 2 % 3.5 4.7 
Siem Reap 99 % 1 % 4.1 5.5 
Banteay Meanchey 94 % 6 % 4.4 5.9 
Pailin 84 % 16 % 3.4 4.6 
Kampong Thom 93 % 7 % 4.6 6.2 
Kampong Cham 96 % 4 % 6.0 8.1 
Average/others 95 % 5 % 4.6 6.1 
 
Table 8.2: Clearance of irrigation canals – cost benefit analysis. 
 
Table 8.2 demonstrates that benefits accruing from the use of irrigation canals have no 
difficulties with justifying the clearance costs. The main factor is the assumption that renewed 
access to irrigation opens up for dry season cultivation of a much larger area than the one that 
needs to be cleared. Benefits are in the range of over 300% to 800% larger than the costs, and 
clearance could be undertaken even in cases when costs are found to be substantially higher 
than the alternatives applied in table 8.2. 
The variations among regions reflect mainly the experienced differences in dry season output 
of crops and the price of paddy. The gains related to avoided human loss constitute a less 
important percentage, but this is only due to the fact that the cleared areas are small compared 
to the extent of the agricultural area that can be reclaimed for dry-season cultivation. The 
expected casualty reduction per unit of area cleared is thus the same as in table 8.1.  
8.4 Wells and water supply 
The benefits from clearance of wells are based on the savings experienced by the local 
community from renewed access to water supply in the vicinity, that is to say the reduced 
travelling cost to distant sources. The savings comprise reduced travel expenses and time loss 
for those family members occupied with fetching water (chapter 6.6). 
 
Clearance of wells 
Improved access Human loss Benefit Cost Ratio 
 
 
Provinces Per cent of benefits US$ 0.90 US$ 0.70 
Battambang 92 % 8 % 3.1 4.3 
Pursat 98 % 2 % 2.8 3.9 
Siem Reap 98 % 2 % 2.8 3.9 
Otdar Meanchey 93 % 7 % 3.0 4.2 
Banteay Meanchey 92 % 8 % 3.1 4.2 
Pailin 85 % 15 % 3.4 4.7 
Kampong Thom 90 % 10 % 3.2 4.4 
Kampong Cham 94 % 6 % 3.0 4.2 
Preah Vihear 93 % 7 % 3.1 4.2 
Average/others 93 % 7 % 3.0 4.2 
 
Table 8.3: Clearance of wells – cost benefit analysis. 
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As shown in table 8.3 the benefits from clearance of wells for local water supply has no 
difficulties with defending the costs. Benefits are in the range of 280% to 470% larger than 
the costs, which means that clearance could also be undertake in cases when the costs for 
some reason were substantially higher than the two alternatives in table 8.3.  
The contribution towards reduced human loss makes up a smaller percentage of the benefits. 
This is, however, only a consequence of the limited areas that need to be cleared (0.2 ha on 
the average) in order to gain renewed access to the water supply. The casualty reduction per 
unit of area cleared is thus the same as previously applied in the analysis. The reduced human 
loss is on the other hand the only factor that causes variations among provinces here. The user 
benefits from renewed access to wells are presumed identical for all provinces in this analysis.   
 
8.5 Roads and bridges 
The benefits from clearance of roads and bridges materialise as a consequence of renewed 
access to shorter alternative routes between origin and destination for the road traffic. It has 
been assumed that the travelling distance on the average can be reduced with 1 km after de-
mining. The benefits from the improved access comprise both reduced vehicle operating costs 
and saved travel time for people using the roads (see chapter 6.4). 
 
Clearance of roads and bridges 
Improved access Human loss Benefit Cost Ratio 
 
 
Provinces Per cent of benefits US$ 0.90 US$ 0.70 
Battambang 90 % 10 % 2.3 3.3 
Pursat 97 % 3 % 2.1 3.0 
Siem Reap 98 % 2 % 2.1 3.0 
Otdar Meanchey 92 % 8 % 2.3 3.2 
Banteay Meanchey 91 % 9 % 2.3 3.3 
Pailin 82 % 18 % 2.7 3.7 
Kampong Thom 88 % 12 % 2.4 3.4 
Kampong Cham 92 % 8 % 2.3 3.2 
Preah Vihear 91 % 9 % 2.3 3.3 
Average/others 91 % 9 % 2.3 3.2 
 
Table 8.4: Clearance of roads and bridges – cost benefit analysis. 
 
Table 8.4 shows that the benefits from renewed access to direct routes can be considerably 
larger that the costs generally required for the clearance of roads and bridges. The benefits are 
in the range of 200% to 370% larger than the costs.  Clearance of roads and bridges could 
thus be undertaken also in cases of a substantially higher cost levels. 
The moderate contribution from reduced human loss reflects the elevated benefits from the 
improved access to direct routes. The casualty reduction per unit of area cleared is thus the 
same as previously applied in the analysis. The reduced human loss is moreover the only 
factor that causes variations among provinces. The road users’ benefits from access to more 




8.6 School premises 
The expected benefits from clearance of school premises are based on an approach similar to 
wells and roads, namely the saved travel cost and travel time for the schoolchildren. When the 
village school premises are contaminated with mines the pupils will presumably have to travel 
a longer distance to some neighbouring school where it is possible to crowd in. The benefits 
comprise reduced travelling expenses in the form of vehicle operating costs and saved travel 
time (see chapter 6.5). 
 
Clearance of schools 
Improved access Human loss Benefit Cost Ratio 
 
 
Provinces Per cent of benefits US$ 0.90 US$ 0.70 
Battambang 83 % 17 % 0.97 1.54 
Pursat 95 % 5 % 0.72 1.21 
Siem Reap 96 % 4 % 0.71 1.20 
Otdar Meanchey 86 % 14 % 0.91 1.45 
Banteay Meanchey 84 % 16 % 0.95 1.51 
Pailin 71 % 29 % 1.32 1.99 
Kampong Thom 80 % 20 % 1.05 1.63 
Kampong Cham 86 % 14 % 0.90 1.45 
Preah Vihear 85 % 15 % 0.94 1.49 
Average/others 85 % 15 % 0.92 1.47 
 
Table 8.5: Clearance of school premises – cost benefit analysis. 
 
The benefits from clearance of school premises are to a large extent capable of defending their 
costs. The benefits from renewed access to near by facilities can exceed costs on their own 
account, but the fact that the mined school area in addition represents a risk of accidents 
constitutes an important additional factor to take into account. The difference among 
provinces in table 8.5 reflects this contribution to reduced human loss. Benefits could be from 
about 70% to almost 200% larger than the costs. 
 
8.7 Historical sites and temples 
The principal benefits from clearance of historical sites and temple areas in Cambodia will be 
the prospects of revenues from the expanding tourist industry. Revenues caused by the 
opening up of new areas have been estimated on basis of today’s earnings from similar places 
(Angkor), with a cautious optimism as of the future prospects for the development of new 
areas (see chapter 6.7).  
 
 Tourist revenues Human loss Benefit Cost Ratio 
 Per cent of benefits US$ 0.90 US$ 0.70 
Clearance of 100% of area 85 % 15 % 0,79 1,30 
Clearance of 75% of area 88 % 12 % 1,29 1,95 
 
Table 8.6: Clearance of historical sites and temples – cost benefit analysis. 
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Still, as shown in table 8.6, the benefits from clearance of historical sites and temple areas 
have generally no difficulties with defending the costs. The tourist revenues alone would 
suffice, but the reduced human loss connected with elimination of the accidents risk when 
mined areas are cleared, will also be a counting factor. 
Net benefits increase with the reduction of clearance costs per m2, but such tasks could in 
general also support high costs if necessary. In some cases the suspected area can be reduced 
in advance, so that more than those areas which need clearance can (safely) be opened up for 
visitors. In table 8.6 an alternative of 75% clearance is assumed. This could contribute to 
increase the net benefits and thus the BCR significantly. 
 
8.8 Health stations 
As with other rural infrastructure (roads, schools, and wells) mine clearance with renewed 
access to health stations can be justified by the reduced travel time and travel costs for the 
villagers that used to attend this particular station. It is here assumed that alternative facilities 
are located at a distance that requires an additional travel of 5 km each way (see chapter 6.8). 
 
 Improved access Human loss Benefit Cost Ratio 
Number of clients Per cent of benefits US$ 0.90 US$ 0.70 
15 persons a day 85 % 15 % 0.82 1.35 
20 persons a day 88 % 12 % 1.34 2.01 
 
Table 8.7: Clearance of health stations – cost benefit analysis. 
 
From table 8.7 it appears that the benefits from renewed access to health stations surpass to a 
large extent the cost of clearing the premises. Both cost alternatives thus come out with 
considerable net surpluses. The benefits will increase proportionally with the number of 
clients, that is to say the persons benefiting from a shorter distance to this important facility. 
The user benefits from improved access constitute the main parts of the benefits, simply 




The main conclusions from the cost benefit analysis is that clearance providing renewed 
access to important rural infrastructure generally is capable of generating the largest gains 
compared with each invested US$. Roads, water supply, schools and health stations are 
excellent candidates in a development perspective, and such clearance tasks should be given 
priority as far as benefits in economic terms are concerned.  
Clearance of historical sites and temples with the aim of attracting tourists should also be 
considered for priority.  The potential here will depend on the accessibility and on other 
infrastructure for receiving the visitors in the vicinity. 
In the agricultural sector a high priority should be given to the reopening of irrigation systems 
permitting dry season cultivation of arable land. Benefits could here be extensive and have 
important consequences for the rural economy and for food production.   
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For agricultural land in general it seems less evident that large-scale clearance programmes 
can be capable of generating economic benefits in a convincing degree. Clearance tasks 
should here be subject to a more thorough selection process in order to determine the priority.  
Clearance for casualty reduction also needs to be well targeted in most cases and locations in 
order to have the desired effect. The selection will further be dependent on the possibility of 
an appropriate identification of those parts of the extensive mined areas in the country that are 
generating the bulk of the mine/Uxo accidents, representing an imminent danger to the people 
now and in future years with expected population movements etc. In spite of the excellent 
statistics on mine/Uxo casualties and incidents in Cambodia, there are lacking elements in the 
analysis that could help direct the clearance activity towards the most risky locations.   
    
9. Evaluation of the Mine Clearance Programme 
An evaluation has been made of the Cambodian mine clearance programme for a recent year. 
The information about cleared areas with distribution on provinces etc has been fetched from 
the 2004 Work Plan, while the distribution of clearance activities on sectors and types of area 
is related to the latest available information, mostly for the year 2003. An area of 29 km2 was 
planned cleared in the year 2004. 
 
Clearance cost per sq m US$ 0.90 US$ 0.70 
Cost Benefit Ratio 0.38 0.78 
Internal Rate of Return 14 % 19 % 
   
 Development Human loss 
Benefits 80 % 20 % 
 
Table 9.1: Appraisal of the Cambodian mine clearance programme 2004.  
 
The analysis shows that mine clearance is contributing substantial values to the country and 
the economy in general. The benefit cost ratio (BCR) is 0.38, implying that benefits in general 
are 38% higher than the costs, on basis of a clearance cost rate of US$ 0.9 per m2. The 
internal rate of return will on the same assumptions be 14%. The benefits are distributed with 
80% on clearance for development and 20% on the reduced human loss.  
 
 Benefits US$ 1000 % of benefits % of area 
Agricultural land 10 344 28 % 65 % 
Irrigation canals 3 448 9 % 2 % 
Roads, bridges 16 669 45 % 19 % 
Wells 1 392 4 % 1 % 
Schools 2 270 6 % 4 % 
Health centres 171 0.5 % 0.4 % 
Temple areas 238 0.7 % 0.6 % 
Other buildings etc. 2 343 6% 6 % 
Total 36 875 100 % 100 % 
 
Table 9.2: Distribution of benefits from the mine clearance programme 2004.  
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The benefits from the clearance programme 2004 amount to about US$ 37 million in total. 
Roads and bridges make up the largest parts of the benefits with 45%, even though the 
clearance tasks under this sector only comprise 19% of the total area cleared. Smaller size 
clearance tasks related to irrigation canals also contribute considerably. For agricultural land 
the situation is inverse, it constitutes as much as 65% of the cleared area while contributing 
28% of the benefits.    
It is clear that the programme net benefits in economic terms could be enhanced by diverting 
more of the clearance activity towards rural infrastructure like roads, water supply, schools 
etc, and also to sites attracting tourism. The agricultural sector could improve its contribution 
by active identification of tasks comprising irrigation components. Future benefits from the 
programme could be increased significantly through a reduction in clearance costs, utilisation 
of mine dogs to a larger degree for example, lowering the costs to US$ 0.7 per m2. Benefits 
could then increase to a level 78% higher than the costs, equivalent to an internal rate of 
return of 19% (table 9.1).  
 
 







ratio (BCR) Human loss Development
Battambang 9146 6292 25 % 0,45 23 % 77 %
Pursat 3829 3060 10 % 0,25 6 % 94 %
Siem Reap 1332 1070 4 % 0,24 7 % 93 %
Otdar Meanchey 7210 5312 20 % 0,36 19 % 81 %
Banteay Meanchey 6305 4580 17 % 0,38 23 % 77 %
Pailin 1546 742 4 % 1,08 33 % 67 %
Kampong Thom 1208 752 3 % 0,61 26 % 74 %
Kampong Cham 320 140 1 % 1,28 13 % 87 %
Preah Vihear 5991 4726 16 % 0,27 23 % 77 %
Total 36886 26673 100 % 0,38 20 % 80 %
 
Table 9.3: Clearance programme 2004, distribution of benefits and clearance cost on province  
 
Regarding the distribution of benefits and clearance costs on province the main conclusions 
are as follows: 
 
– Benefits cover clearance costs in all provinces. 
– The 4 provinces of Battambang, Odtar Meanchey, Banteay Meanchey and Preah 
Vihear collect the bulk (78%) of the benefits from the 2004 clearance programme. 
– The benefit-cost ratio (BCR) is, however, highest in Kampong Cham and Pailin. 
– The main part of the benefits comes from gains related to economic development. 
Still the reduced human loss is an essential factor, contributing to increase the 




10. Poverty Reduction and Millennium Development Goals 
10.1 Assumptions 
The mine action programme is actively contributing to the socio-economic development of 
the country, and in particular to the achievement of goals related to the poverty reduction 
strategy and the Millennium Development Goals (MDG). Specific problems with the 
fulfilment of MDG 9: “De-mining, Uxo and Victim Assistance” have been discussed 
previously in the report, with the assessment of the programme achievements (chapter 4.3) 
among others. This chapter will therefore concentrate on the impact of the mine action 
programme in other areas related to poverty reduction and MDGs. 
The analysis is based on clearance statistics for the period 1992-2003 broken down on 
provinces. This statistics is, however, incomplete and no information has been obtained from 
RCAF.85 Still this information gives presumably the best available distribution of the amount 
of areas cleared during the period 1992-2003 in per cent on each province. The total amount 
of areas cleared, about 250 km2, has thus been distributed accordingly.    
Regarding the type of areas cleared, the analysis has to rely on information from recent years, 
mainly 2003 (as of figure 4.2), since information of this aspect is scarce for the preceding 
years. There is also little information about the type of areas cleared broken down on province 
level. The same pro rata distribution has therefore been used for all the provinces. 
Information particularly scarce regarding RCAF’s activities; still the total area cleared by 
RCAF has been included here. There is reason to believe, however, that more information 
would reveal a larger percentage of road clearance by RCAF than is the case for the other 
agencies. 
 
10.2 Increased food production 
Constituting 65% of the cleared areas in general, it is found that over 160 km2 of agricultural 
land has been cleared by the Cambodian mine action programme during the period 1992-
2003.86 The largest share of this land is found in the provinces Banteay Meanchey, 
Battambang and Siem Reap, reflecting the fact that the largest part of the clearance activities 
has taken place in those provinces over the period considered. 
Presuming that these areas are taken into use for paddy-growing, they could yield a net 
amount of over 20,000 tonnes of paddy at disposal for consumption (table 10.1). The 
assumptions of net yield in tonnes per ha etc are then the same as in table 6.1.   
Additionally a total of over 140 km of irrigation canals have been cleared in the period. One 
km of irrigation canals could supposedly feed 1 km2 of arable land with water, making 
cultivation of that land possible also in the dry season, a total of two paddy crops a year (see 
chapter 6.2). This additional dry season crop could boost rice production even more, 
presumably with over 30,000 tonnes in total in the principal mine and Uxo-infested provinces.  
The increase in paddy production could thus amount to over 50,000 tonnes on a yearly basis 
in total for these provinces compared to the pre-clearance levels (before 1992). This 
                                                 
85 Some problems with this statistics are discussed in chapter 4.3. 
86 Comprising land for agriculture and resettlement in the clearance statistics and figure 4.2. 
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production has been made possible on reclaimed agricultural land and through renewed access 










 ha km tonnes per cent 1000 
Banteay Meanchey 4 562 40.7 15 832 8 % 45.6
Battambang 3 902 34.8 16 132 6 % 39.0
Kampong Cham 499 4.4 2 982 1 % 5.0
Kampong Speu 797 7.1 2 938 3 % 8.0
Kampong Thom 880 7.8 3 515 2 % 8.8
Kampot 795 7.1 3 005 2 % 7.9
Pailin 354 3.2 1 305 100 % 3.5
Kep 367 3.3 402 13 % 3.7
Odtar Meanchey 1 464 13.0 1 375 5 % 14.6
Preah Vihear 268 2.4 350 1 % 2.7
Pursat 371 3.3 1 572 1 % 3.7
Siem Reap 2 158 19.2 7 465 4 % 21.6
Total 16 416 146.4 56 874 3 % 164.2
 
Table 10.1: Effects on annual agricultural production volume from clearance during the 
programme period 1992-2003. 
 
Table 10.1 distributes the effect on agricultural production on provinces. In general there is a 
3% growth in paddy production which can be directly related to clearance under the mine 
action programme.  
In some areas, however, the effect could be stronger. In the small province of Pailin about 
half of the area at disposal for paddy cultivation today (2002-03) has been subject to 
mine/Uxo clearance, according to the analysis here. With an addition of 3.2 km of irrigation 
canals cleared, it seems that large parts of the agricultural areas now at disposal in the 
province could have been affected by the mine clearance programme.87 Kep is another small 
province where mine action could have had decisive impacts on the availability of arable land. 
In the larger mine-infested provinces like Banteay Meanchey, Battambang and Odtar 
Meanchey, the contribution from mine action towards increase in food production could have 
been between 8% and 5%, which is still significant.  
Clearance of areas that can be reclaimed for agricultural production could thus have strong 
impacts for MDG 1- Overall target 2, concerned with reducing the proportion of people 
suffering from hunger. 
With the establishment of a transparent and equitable system for redistribution of the 
reclaimed land, which is a main goal under the mine action programme, the clearance of areas 
for resettlement will in general also be important for MDG 7- Overall target 16, to improve 
the access to land security.  
The plot size needed for a family may be about 2 ha, but in most cases only parts of it will be 
mine/Uxo contaminated. Clearance of about 1000 m2 may thus allow a family to settle and 
reclaim the larger area needed to subsist. On this assumption the clearance programme could 
have benefited over 160,000 families over the period 1992-2003, or more than 13,000 on the 
                                                 
87 The previous reservations are still valid, however; the information of agricultural areas and irrigation canals 
cleared in each province are calculated figures, and not based on detailed statistics.  
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average each year (varying according to the annual amount of clearance activity). The 
geographical distribution is given in table 10.1, with the provinces of  Banteay Meanchey, 
Battambang and Siem Reap as the main beneficiaries.  
 
10.3 Rural transport 
The existence of an extensive rural roads network is an important element in the food security 
strategy. The road network can provide efficient transport of produce out of regions with 
surpluses and into regions exposed to bad harvests and drought, thus encouraging the 
domestic trade in foodstuffs i.a.  
In general the access to roads is vital for development of the rural areas, for poverty reduction 
and access to social services in general. The much needed expansion of the Cambodian 
agricultural sector for example is depending on access to transport. 
Clearance of rural roads has been a main component in mine action. It is estimated that a total 
of over 1000 km of roads have been cleared during the programme period 1992-2003. 
Frequently there will, however, be significant needs for rehabilitation, so as a rule the 
clearance activities constitute integral parts of rural roads programmes. 
There is actually a gazetted network of 4,700 km of rural roads in Cambodia, while 
ungazetted roads and tracks might comprise as much as 28,000 km. Under the cooperation 
programme financed by Germany (TRIP), about 1,600 km have been rehabilitated.  
 
 Roads km













Table 10.2: Clearance of roads under the mine action programme 1992-2003. 
 
10.4 Water supply, schools and health stations. 
De-mining school premises can contribute to fulfilling MDG 2- Overall target 3, aiming at 
improving the education system so that more children can be able to complete school. It is 
estimated that a total of over 800 schools have been cleared of mines/Uxo under the mine 
action programme 1992-2003.  
Mine clearance is also frequently required to provide access to rural health stations, which are 
much needed in the fight against the spread of diseases like HIV/AIDS and malaria (MDG 6) 
and to reduce child mortality (MDG 4) and maternal mortality (MGD 5). It is estimated that 
about 60 health stations have been cleared under the mine action programme. 
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Clearance of water supply systems and rural wells could have a direct impact on MDG 7- 
Overall target 14, addressing the problem of improved access to safe drinking water. As much 
as 1400 wells and ponds could have been cleared in the course of the mine action programme 
1992-2003. 
Clearance of rural roads will frequently constitute an important supplement as a prerequisite 
to gain access to other rural infrastructure and social services. 
 
 Wells Schools Health stations 
Banteay Mean Chey 450 258 21 
Battambang 385 221 18 
Kampong Cham 49 28 2 
Kampong Speu 79 45 4 
Kampong Thom 87 50 4 
Kampot 78 45 4 
Pailin 35 20 2 
Kep 36 21 2 
Odtar Meanchey 144 83 7 
Preah Vihear 26 15 1 
Pursat 37 21 2 
Total 1407 806 64 
 










11. Main Conclusions 
Mine action is contributing substantial values to the Cambodian economy and the country in 
general. Analysis of the 2004 clearance programme comes out with a benefit cost ratio (BCR) 
of 0.38, implying that benefits are in general 38% higher than the costs, on basis of an average 
clearance cost rate of US$ 0.9 per m2. The internal rate of return will on the same assumptions 
be 14%. 
The benefits amount to about US$ 37 million in total, distributed with 80% on clearance for 
development and 20% on reduced human loss. Roads and bridges make up the largest parts 
with 45%, even though such clearance tasks only comprise 19% of the total area cleared. 
Smaller size tasks related to irrigation canals also contribute considerably. For agricultural 
land the situation is inverse, it constitutes as much as 65% of the cleared area while making 
up 28% of the benefits. In total about 29 km2 of mined areas were planned cleared in 2004. 
The benefits from renewed access to more direct road links can be considerably larger that the 
costs required for clearance. Clearance of roads and bridges could thus be undertaken also in 
cases of relatively high cost levels. The benefits from renewed access to wells for local water 
supply, schools and health stations have likewise few difficulties with justifying clearance, on 
basis of the reduced travel time and travel costs for the users and the pupils.  
These are excellent candidates in a development perspective, and such tasks should be given 
priority as far as benefits in economic terms are concerned. It is evident that the programme 
benefits could be enhanced by diverting more of the clearance activity towards rural 
infrastructure like roads, water supply, schools etc, and also to sites attracting tourism.  
The output per ha of arable land is on the average rather moderate in Cambodia. Yet the main 
conclusion is not that clearance of agricultural areas is unprofitable. There is, however, a call 
for conscious prioritization, a planning process capable of identifying those areas and tasks 
that are of highest importance to the local communities.  
In the agricultural sector high priority should be given to the reopening of irrigation systems 
permitting dry season cultivation of arable land. Benefits could here be extensive and have 
important consequences for the rural economy and for food production.  
Clearance for casualty reduction also needs to be well targeted in most cases and locations in 
order to have the desired effect. Improved assessments could be made of which parts of the 
extensive mined area in the country that are generating the bulk of the mine/Uxo accidents, 
representing a danger to the people now and in future years with expected population 
movements etc. In spite of the excellent statistics on mine/Uxo casualties and incidents in 
Cambodia, there are lacking elements in the analysis that could help direct the clearance 
activity towards the most risky locations. 
Benefits cover clearance costs in all provinces. The 4 provinces of Battambang, Odtar 
Meanchey, Banteay Meanchey and Preah Vihear collect the bulk (78%) of the benefits from 
the 2004 clearance programme. The benefit-cost ratio (BCR) is, however, highest in 
Kampong Cham and Pailin. The main part of the benefits comes from gains related to 
economic development. Still the reduced human loss is an essential factor, contributing to 
increase the benefits from land clearance particularly in Pailin.  
Mine action’s contribution in the years 1992-2003 to increase the country’s paddy production 
could amount to over 50,000 tonnes annually. This production increase has been made 
possible on reclaimed agricultural land and through renewed access to irrigation canals. This 
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constitutes in general a 3% growth in paddy production in the mine action regions, but could 
be even more important for food security in provinces like Pailin, Kep, Banteay Meanchey 
and Battambang. 
A transparent and equitable system for redistribution of the reclaimed land is an important 
goal under the mine action programme. The cleared areas may have provided land and 
contributed to improve land security for about 160,000 families over the period 1992-2003, 
that is to say for over 13,000 on the average each year.  
Clearance of water supply systems and rural wells has improved the access to safe drinking 
water in rural areas. An estimated 1400 wells and ponds have been cleared in the course of the 
mine action programme 1992-2003. 
De-mining school premises contributes to improve the education system so that more children 
are able to complete school. Mine clearance is also frequently required to provide access to 
rural health stations, which are much needed in the fight against spread of diseases and to 
reduce child and maternal mortality. It is estimated that about 60 health stations have been 
cleared under the mine action programme. 
The CMAA Socio-economic Cluster should in particular have a responsibility with following 
up the cost-benefit analysis.  
There are indications that landmine damage to domestic animals might constitute a significant 
economic loss. This could call for an improved reporting system, if possible through CMVIS. 
The extent of the mine/Uxo infested area in Cambodia is disputed; in particular what parts of 
it should be given priority for clearance. It is strongly recommended to revise the estimates of 
the contaminated area. 
The CMAA database on cleared areas needs to be consolidated, so that it can provide official 
figures for clearance on location (province, district), types of areas, techniques etc for the 
individual years since the start of the mine action programme. As of today this information 
exists on different files which can be incomplete and inconsistent. 
The operators should be required to provide better data on the cost of conducting mine action 
activities. Some operators are in the process of developing their accounting procedures, which 
could result in better cost-estimates with more details on different types of areas, tasks and 
techniques, information which to a large degree is non-existent now. As a first approach more 
information about the clearance time (in hours) of different types of tasks and areas could be 
demanded. 
A library or Information and Documentation Centre should be established at CMAA to secure 
the institutional memory, comprising publications and reports issued by the programme and 
its service providers as well as literature related to mine action in general. Documents should 
be available in hard copies and/or in electronic format on computers and compact discs to 
facilitate copying and dissemination. Fire-protected and waterproof storing conditions should 





Annex 1: Planning tools for mine action 
A 1: Objective 
The objective of this Annex 1 is to devise some straightforward methods, based on cost-
benefit analysis, to be applied as instruments for assessing socio-economic and poverty 
reduction impacts of future mine clearance operations. The approach will be largely identical 
with the analysis presented in the previous chapters of this report, but with modifications 
making it simple and flexible, not requiring large analytical efforts. 
A 2: First step 
As a first step the data presented in chapter 8 of this report should be fully utilised. The tables 
8.1 to 8.7 display the benefit-cost ratio (BCR) for presumably typical clearance tasks related 
to standard areas of intervention like: 
– Agricultural land (8.2) 
– Irrigation systems (8.3) 
– Wells and water supply (8.4). 
– Roads and bridges (8.5) 
– School premises (8.6) 
– Historical sites and temples (8.7) 
– Health stations (8.8) 
The BCR calculations there are also broken down on the provinces of most importance for the 
mine action programme today. 
This information could be applied as a first step without any modifications, also in the 
analysis of new cases. On basis of knowledge about the use of the cleared area and the 
province in which it is located, the BCR of the new clearance task proposed could be read 
directly from those tables. 
 
A 3: Second step 
A second step will be to modify the input data so that the analysis can be made representative 
and reflect in a better way the situation for which it is to be applied. No elements are in 
principal fixed in this methodology, but this second step consists of devising some simplified 
ways of modelling the main elements of the analysis, without having to go too far into the 
spreadsheet details that form the ultimate basis of this report. This second step approach will 
thus concentrate on providing the analyst with an opportunity to modify the main cost and 
benefit elements of the BCR. 
 










The assumptions behind the cost calculation are in this analysis very simple (see chapter 7). 
The range of cost alternatives vary between US$ 0.9 per m2 (US$ 9,000 per ha or US$ 0.9 
million per km2) as of today’s average cost, to a possible level of US$ 0.7 per m2, in case 
more dog-clearance could be an alternative.   
For the analysis of future clearance tasks, information should be obtained from the operators 
or estimated in other ways as appropriate from case to case. When data is scarce a sensitivity 
analysis in two or more alternatives could be performed. 
 
Reduced human loss 
The evaluation of the benefits from reduced human loss (chapter 5) is rather complex and 
based on a number of assumptions about the value of productive life time, medical costs, the 
characteristics of a typical mine victim, age, types of injury etc. The combined effect of these 
different factors has been evaluated in economic terms, and the result presented as the 
economic loss related to an average mine/Uxo casualty.  
As a first step it is assumed that a mined area of 1 km2 can be expected to claim one victim 
every year. The costs in economic terms related to this loss are given in table A1 as US$ 
164,000 (for further reference see chapter 5 in the report).  
 
Table A1: Cost benefit calculations related to the human loss: 
(1): Economic loss for an average casualty, one victim every year over 20 
years, 1000 US$: 
164 
(2): Area to be cleared or suspected area: 1 km2. 
(3): Number of victims per unit of mined area: 1 victim per km2.
(4): Economic growth: 3.5% 
 
This basic figure of US$ 164,000 can then be modified in the following ways: 
– When the area to be cleared is different from 1 km2, the economic loss (1) will 
have to be multiplied with the appropriate relative size of minefield. A mined area 
of 2 km2 is thus expected to cause the double loss, that is to say US$ 328,000. 
– The expected number of victims may be different from 1 per year per km2. In the 
cost benefit analysis the number of victims varied on province (from 0.4 to 4.7 per 
year, see table 5.1). The economic loss (1) in table A1 will therefore have to be 
multiplied with the appropriate figure for the expected number of victims, 2 
casualties a year will entail the double loss, 1.5 a 50% larger loss etc. 
– In the previous analysis (chapter 5.2) an economic growth of 3.5% was assumed 
for the first 10 years and 2.5% afterwards. The economic loss (1) in table A1 
should accordingly be updated, from the year 2006 and onwards according to the 
development of the Cambodian GNP per capita. 
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On basis of these possibilities for modifications new and different estimates of the avoided 
human loss can be worked out as appropriate for the case under consideration, reflecting the 
available information on local conditions etc.  
    
Agricultural land 
The valuation of cleared agricultural land is based on the assumption that it can be used for 
paddy production and for raising livestock for own consumption or sale (see chapter 6.1). The 
main variables in these calculations are factors like the production yield in tonnes per ha, the 
farm-gate price of paddy, the number of animals raised or sold per year (pigs and poultry) and 
the sales price for these animals.  
A standard case can be constructed, leaving a number of factors open for adaptation to local 
circumstances from case to case:  
 
Table A2: Cost-benefit calculations related to agricultural land. 
Assumptions: Value 1000 US$ 
(1): Paddy growing Yield: 1 tonne per ha Price: 100 US$/tonne 75 
(2): Pigs raising 1 pig per ha land Price: US$ 50 each 54 
(3): Poultry 10 per ha of land Price: US$ 2 a piece  21 
(4): Possibility for dry season crops  
(5) Total revenues from 1 km2 of agricultural land: SUM 
 
In table A2 the net future revenues expected from paddy growing on 1 km2 of land amount to 
a value of US$ 75,000 based on the assumption of a yield of 1 tonne per ha and a price of 100 
US$ per tonne. When the conditions related with a specific clearance task are different, the 
value of 75,000 US$ should be modified accordingly. In case of a price per tonne of 110 US$ 
for example, the value will increase by 10% (to US$ 82,500), the same will be the case if the 
yield is expected to be 1.1 tonne per ha instead if 1 tonne. 
The same approach can be used for modifying the contribution from the livestock business. If 
1.5 pigs can be raised annually instead of 1 per ha land, the value should be increased by 50% 
from US$ 54,000 to US$ 81,000; price variations will have similar effects. In the analysis 
(table 6.1) differences were found in yield per ha and in the number of livestock raised per ha 
of agricultural land according to province. 
The possibility for dry season crops on the cleared land should be investigated, in particular 
the percentage of the land that can normally be replanted. The information in table A2 on 
paddy growing (1) could then be used to add the value of an extra crop, specifying the 
appropriate yield in tonnes per ha replanted, and the price. Sometimes these will be different 
from the wet season crops (see table 6.1). 
By adding the modified revenues in table A2 from (1) paddy growing, (2) pigs, (3) poultry 
and (4) an extra dry season crop which may be possible on (parts of) the land, the total 
amount of revenues from the use of 1 km2 reclaimed agricultural land can be determined. 
When the extent of the land to be cleared is different from 1 km2, the sum (5) must be altered 
as appropriate. 
In some cases it may be found that additional formerly suspected areas can be reclaimed 
without clearance, by area reduction techniques etc. An extra percentage may then be added 
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to the benefits, without increasing the clearance costs (see chapter 6.1). This must, however, 
be investigated from case to case. 
To the agricultural benefits from reclaimed land (table A2) will be added the benefits from the 
expected reduction of human loss on the same land (table A1). These two elements will form 
the benefit side in the benefit-cost ratio (BCR). The clearance costs must then be estimated. 
Finally the clearance task can be evaluated by calculating the BCR. 
 
Irrigation canals 
The benefits from clearance of irrigation canals are related to the extra output from the land 
which gains renewed access to irrigation as a direct cause of the clearance. It is assumed that 
this land can now produce dry season crops, and a main input to the analysis will therefore be 
the estimated value of that extra crop. These benefits will be identical with table A2 (1) paddy 
growing, while no changes are here presumably inflicted on the livestock business. 
 
Table A3: Cost-benefit analysis of clearance in irrigation systems. 
Assumptions: Value 1000 US$ 
(1): Paddy growing Yield: 1 tonne per ha Price: 100 US$/tonne 75 
(2): Total revenues from 1 km2 of agricultural land: SUM 
(3): One km of irrigation canals will serve 1 km2 of arable land. 
(4): One km of irrigation canals constitutes a clearance task of 4 ha. 
 
The value of the dry season paddy crop (1) must, however, be updated with appropriate 
estimates for the yield in tonne per ha, which may be higher than in the wet season (see table 
6.1), and also for the farm gate price of paddy. This will result in an estimate of the total 
revenues from 1 km2 of agricultural land (2). 
Formerly in the cost benefit analysis it has been assumed that one km of irrigation canals can 
serve 1 km2 of arable land with irrigation water for a dry season crop (3). This proportion can, 
however, vary from case to case. An independent appraisal should be made about the amount 
of land to be irrigated by the particular canal that is considered cleared, so that the revenue 
estimate (2) can be modified accordingly (an area of ½ km2 will generate ½ of the revenues). 
It was assumed (4) that one km of irrigation canals constitutes a clearance task of 4 ha. The 
canal is then cleared in 20 m wide lanes on both sides. This assumption is also open to 
modifications, which will affect the cost side of the BCR.  
A special feature with irrigation canals is that the area which needs clearance and entails costs 
normally will be much smaller than the land which reaps the benefits. The potential for 
avoided human loss will, however, be related to the area which has been cleared. This benefit 
component should be added (see table A1).  







Roads and bridges 
In the analysis it was presumed that a kilometre of mined roads will cause diversion of traffic 
onto other links of double distance on the average (see chapter 6.4). The benefits from 
clearance of 1 km of mined roads will thus consist of the savings to road traffic and transport 
from travelling a 1 km shorter route.  
This proportion may vary from case to case. The length of the alternative routes should 
therefore be assed independently to reflect local conditions and take into account the actual 
extra travel distances experienced by the road users. 
 
Table A4: Cost benefit analysis of road clearance 
Assumptions: US$ 1000 
(1): Benefits from clearance of 1 km of rural roads 108 
(2): One km of mined roads will divert traffic onto routes of double distance. 
(3): Traffic level 
(4): A 1 km road link constitutes a clearance task of 4 ha. 
 
The additional transport costs when the road users have to travel one km extra is calculated to 
US$ 108,000 in table A4 (1). This is the amount that can be saved when the road opened after 
clearance shortens the travel distance with one km on the average. The relevant issue here will 
be the difference between the distance travelled before and after clearance of a particular road 
link. If this difference is larger than 1 km, say 1.5 km, the benefits (1) should be increased by 
50%, and in case the difference is only 0.5 km the benefits will be ½ of US$ 108,000. 
Another important element for determining the benefit side will be the traffic. This was 
estimated on basis of traffic counts in rural areas (table 6.4), comprising a daily traffic of: 
– Ox-carts: 19. 
– Bicycles: 13. 
– Motorbikes: 297. 
– Motor trailers: 26. 
– Car/ pickups: 19. 
– Trucks: 5. 
 
This traffic level is reflected in the benefit estimate of US$ 108,000. Independent estimates 
should be made, however, and in case the road traffic in the particular case is found to be 
significantly higher or lower, the benefit sum should be amended accordingly. A traffic level 
which is generally 25% higher than the figures indicated above will thus generate 25% more 
benefits. Particular attention should be made to the level of motorised traffic, as this will have 
the largest impact on the benefits.  
It was further assumed (4) that one km of road constitutes a clearance task of 4 ha. The road is 
then cleared in 20 m wide lanes on both sides. This is standard for clearance tasks ordered by 
ADB for instance. The total area to be cleared will then depend on the length of the mined 
road, which will determine the clearance costs. The area to be cleared will also form basis for 
an estimate of the benefits from the expected reduced human loss (table A2). 
The state of repair of the road ought to be taken into account. Clearance tasks regularly form 
integral parts of rural roads rehabilitation programmes. Rehabilitation of rural roads may cost 
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between US$ 6,000 (upgrading) and US$ 12,000 (improved standard) per km, but the actual 
need must here be assessed from case to case. 
The clearance task can then be evaluated by calculating the BCR.  
 
Schools 
The benefits from clearance of school premises were based on the assumption that the pupils 
will have to travel an extra distance of 5 km each way in order to reach an alternative location. 
The benefits from saving these travel costs after clearance are given in table A5 as US$ 
18,000. 
 
Table A5: Cost-benefit analysis of clearance of school premises. 
Assumptions: US$ 1000 
(1): Benefits from clearance of school premises 18 
(2): Extra travel distance 5 km each way every day. 
(3): Number of pupils travelling: 80 
(4): School areas constitute clearance tasks of 1.2 ha. 
 
The difference in distance between travelling to the reopened school compared with the 
alternatives used before clearance will here be the issue. In case this difference is calculated to 
more than 5 km, the benefits will be higher than US$ 18,000. An extra travel distance 
calculated to 10 km will here generate the double benefits. 
Another factor that will influence the benefit side is the number of pupils at the school. Here it 
is assumed that 80 pupils will be travelling. With 60 pupils, or 25% less, the benefits from 
reopening the school will also be 25% less. 
It was assumed that a school area constitutes a clearance task of 1.2 ha. This area might, 
however, vary from case to case. Clearance costs will depend on the extent of the area to be 
cleared. Possible repair costs should be taken into account, but not upgrading. The cleared 
area will also form basis for an estimate of the benefits from reduced human loss (table A2).  
The project can then be evaluated by calculating the BCR. Here the two benefit components, 
reduced travel distance for the pupils and reduced human loss will be compared to the 
clearance costs. 
 
Wells and water supply 
The benefits from clearance of rural wells can also be related to the extra travel distance 
needed for the villagers to reach an alternative supply. Here it has been assumed that the extra 
distance to the nearest source could be 5 km longer on the average each way. Further it has 
been assumed that 15 persons are occupied with the daily fetching of water. The travel costs 
related to this extra distance for the 15 persons involved can then be saved after de-mining of 





Table A6: Cost-benefit analysis of water supply 
Assumptions: US$ 1000 
(1): Benefits from clearance of wells 6.8 
(2): Extra distance to nearest source: 5 km each way 
(3): Persons occupied with fetching water: 15 
(4): Wells constitute clearance tasks of 0.2 ha 
  
The benefit will depend on the extra distance travelled, which should be assessed 
independently in each case. A 25% larger difference in travel distance between the reopened 
local water supply and the alternatives used before clearance will increase the benefits with 
about 25%. 
The size of the local community using the well, reflected in the number of persons engaged in 
fetching water will also be of importance. In case of a larger community with 30 persons 
travelling to fetch water, the benefits from clearing the local water supply will rise to the 
double that is to say US$ 13,600. 
An important factor will be the extent of the area which needs to be cleared. Based on 
experience it was assumed in the analysis that a well may constitute a clearance task of 0.2 ha. 
This must be assessed, however, from case to case. Clearance costs will depend on the area 
size. Possible repair costs should be taken into account. The cleared area will also form basis 
for an estimate of the benefits from the expected reduced human loss (table A2).  
The project can then be evaluated by calculating the BCR. Here the two benefit components, 




A similar model as applied above for schools and wells can be used also for calculating the 
benefits from clearance of health station areas. It was assumed that when the premises are 
mined, people from the neighbouring villages may have to travel on the average 5 km longer 
each way to reach the nearest facility. In addition there were presumably 15 persons attending 
the particular health station on a daily basis (see chapter 6.8).  
The total benefits from avoiding this extra travel effort have been calculated to US$ 16,700 in 
table A7. 
 
Table A7: Cost-benefit analysis of clearance of health stations 
Assumptions: US$ 1000 
(1): Benefits from clearance of health stations, US$ 1000 16.7 
(2): Additional travel distance 5 km each way  
(3): Persons travelling: 15 daily 
(4): Health stations constitute clearance tasks of 1.2 ha 
 
The benefits will depend on the extra distance travelled, which should be assessed 
independently in each case. A 25% larger difference in travel distance between the reopened 
local health station and the alternatives used before clearance will increase the benefits with 
25%. 
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The size of the local community using the health station, or the number of visitors, will also 
be of importance. In case of a larger community with 30 daily visitors, the benefits from 
clearance will be the double that is to say US$ 33,400. 
An important factor is the size of the area that needs to be cleared. Based on experience it was 
assumed in the analysis that a well could constitute a clearance task of 1.2 ha. This must be 
assessed, however, from case to case. Clearance costs will depend on the area size. Possible 
repair costs, but not upgrading, should be taken into account. The cleared area will also form 
basis for an estimate of the benefits from reduced human loss (table A2).  
The project can then be evaluated by calculating the BCR. Here the two benefit components, 
reduced travel distance to the health centre and reduced human loss will be compared to the 
clearance costs. 
 
Temple areas and tourism 
The benefits from clearance of temple areas are related to the net revenues the country can 
gain from the extra tourists attracted and the expected expansion of the tourist industry. The 
benefits from opening up an additional km2 of temple areas have thus been calculated to US$ 
1.36 million in extra future revenues (see chapter 6.7). 
 
Table A8: Cost benefit analysis for clearance of temple areas 
Assumptions: US$ 1000 
(1): Benefits from opening up 1 km2 of temple areas 1362 
(2): Tourist contribution to GNP: US$ 200 per visitor 
(3): Number of tourists: 800 per km2 of temple area reopened per year. 
 
These incomes will be dependent on a number of factors, a contribution to GNP of US$ 200 
per visitor, and a number of new tourists amounting to 800 annually per km2 of temple area 
reopened. Revised assumptions here will cause corresponding relative changes in the amount 
of benefits (1), 25% fewer visitors will thus cause 25% less revenues etc. 
Revenues and clearance costs will also be proportionate with the size of the area to be cleared 
and reopened for tourism. The cleared area will also form basis for an estimate of the benefits 
from the expected reduced human loss (table A2).  
The clearance task can then be evaluated by calculating the BCR.  
 
Other buildings 
The benefits from clearance tasks involving buildings (public offices etc) can often be related 
to the corresponding construction costs and/or the value of the terrain. The state of repair of 
the building must then be taken into account.    
 
A 4: Third step 
A third step might consist of courses in cost-benefit analysis in mine action, using the 
methodology provided in this report or extended versions. The participants would then be 
introduced to the full version of cost-benefit analysis with the accompanying spreadsheet 
facilities. New studies could be undertaken based on disaggregated data as appropriate.  
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Name Position Institution e-mail: 
telephone: 
Mr Dominique Pierre 
Guéret 
Senion Mine Action 
Consultant 
Cambodian Mine Action and 









HE Sam Sotha Secretary General 
CMAA 
Cambodian Mine Action and 




Mr Leng Sochea Deputy Secretary 
General CMAA 
Cambodian Mine Action and 




Mr Niem Chouleng Advisor Council of Ministers 012 494500 
Mr Lim Sothy Programme Assistant Cambodian Mine Action and 








Mr In Channa Deputy Director 
Database Department 
Cambodian Mine Action and 




Mr Boeun Chan Born Senior Socio-economic 
Officer, Socio- 
Economic Cluster 
Cambodian Mine Action and 
Victim Assistance Authority 
(CMAA) 
 
Mr Marc Bonnet Regional Resident 
Representative 
Norwegian People’s Aid – 
South East Asia 
marc.bonnet@cambodia.npaid.org 
855 23 210383 
855 12 817219 
Ms Krisna Uk Programme 
Development officer 
Norwegian People’s Aid – 
South East Asia 
krisna.uk@cambodia.npaid.org 
855 12 627973 
Mr Ian Thomas Technical Advisor Cambodian Mine Action and 




Mr Robert Keeley Explosive Ordnance 
Disposal Consultant 
RK Consulting bobkeeley@compuserve.com 
44 (0) 7788 585828 
Mr Chhiv Lim Project Manager Cambodia Mine/Uxo Victim 
Information System (CMVIS) 
cmvis@bigpond.com.kh 
855 23 216075 
Mr David Hayter Country Programme 
Manager 
Mines Advisory Group 
(MAG) 
cpm@mag.org.kh 













Name Position Institution e-mail: 
telephone: 
Gen. Khem Sophoan Director General Cambodian Mine Action 
Center (CMAC) 
khsophoan@cmac.org.kh 
855 12 722333 
HE Heng Ratana Deputy Director 
General 
Cambodian Mine Action 
Center (CMAC) 
hrattana@cmac.org.kh 
855 12 800169 
Col. Jean Pierre 
Billault 
 Cambodian Mine Action 
Center (CMAC) 
855 12 858010 




Handicap International hib.rehab_dpt@online.com.kh 
855 12 651228 
Mr Sao Sopheap Assistant 
representative 
Food and Agricultural 
Organization (FAO) 
sopheap.sao@fao.org 
855 12 814673 
Mr Richard Boulter Programme manager The Halo Trust halocambodia@online.com.kh 
855 12 801809 
Mr Michael Bartura Finance manager The Halo Trust halocambodia@everyday.com.kh 
855 12 896840 
Mr Mean Sarun Demining Unit Manger CMAC Demining Unit 6 Billault.jp@camintel.com 
855 12 630292 
Mr Ron J Davies Consultant CMAC rdavies@cmac.org.kh 
855 012 683341 
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